

While the inhabitants of the American area were keenly interested in the various problems with which Germany was faced during the spring of 1920, they preserved their habitual calm. Little attention was paid to party politics and the agitation of the separatists was viewed with something akin to indifference. Led by Smeets, who was coming to the fore in the movement, the Rhenish Republican Party, met in Bonn and resolved to increase their propaganda for separation from Germany. The agitation was continued, but it remained relatively unimportant. Even the movement for separation from Prussia became dormant after all parties, except the Communists, had met at Koenigswinter (in the neutral zone) in June and announced that there would be no separation from Prussia, until the occupation of the Rhineland had come to an end. A press rumor that the French Foreign Office favored Dr. Dorten for appointment as German Commissioner for the Occupied Territories—the previous incumbent, Herr von Starck, having resigned¹—aroused a wave of combined indignation and derision. The report was immediately denied, and the German papers that had published it were admonished.

Living conditions in the American area improved appreciably during the period, and there too the food situation became no longer a serious problem. There were a number of wage disputes and a few small strikes, but on the whole it was a comparatively quiet season in labor circles. Industrial conditions proved much better than had been predicted, despite the customs barrier. The fuel situation was good until June when coal deliveries decreased and caused fears of an actual shortage to arise. Traffic on the Rhine, which had been much interfered with by low water resumed almost its normal volume

¹ Volume I, Chapter 2.

in the latter part of the period when rains caused a rise in the river. Generally similar conditions prevailed in the other occupied zones, and it was a fact that the general economic situation in the Rhineland was better than it had been earlier in the year.

Business and industrial circles in the occupied territories had been profuse in their prophecies that the application of the customs sanctions would cause the economic ruin of Germany, and more particularly of the Rhineland. In this they had been joined by the press of all Germany. The customs barrier proved injurious, but it appeared that the main reason therefor was to be found in the delay caused by the customs examinations; these caused a great congestion at the control stations and a shortage of freight cars developed. After a period of nervousness, business in general became steady, so to speak, and endeavored to accustom itself to the new conditions. Reports soon demonstrated the harmful effects of the customs regime, particularly in the metal, chemical and leather industries. Before long, however, some industries in the American area had secured certain exemptions, and by June the customs control had been relaxed and a number of articles had been put on the free list. These measures were helpful to industry and it soon became clear that the customs sanctions were not having a vital effect upon German trade.

As the customs dues were collected in paper marks and the amounts received was not very large, it became apparent that the financial benefit to the Allies would be relatively unimportant. And as the harmful effect upon German trade and industry was not great, it was seen that as a coercive measure the customs sanctions would not prove of much further effect.¹ Some averred that the ultimate effect upon Allied interests would be detrimental rather than

¹ Their alleged purpose had been achieved when Germany accepted the Allies' ultimatum on May 10.

beneficial. Germans as well as others asserted that the customs sanctions constituted a political rather than an economic measure, and before the end of the period discussions relative to the abolition of the sanctions had commenced among the Allies.

Among the prominent visitors to Coblenz in April were the Hon. Hugh Wallace, American Ambassador to France and Marshal d'Espercy of the French Army. During the same month the General Staff of the Belgian Army of Occupation paid a return visit to the American Headquarters and were shown the various activities of the A.F.G. On April 18 a conference of the Chaplains of the Armies of Occupation was held in Coblenz, 32 attending.

In June there came M. Barthou, French Minister of War, M. Loucheur, French Minister for the Liberated Regions, Major General Henry G. Sharpe (formerly Quartermaster General of the United States Army), and the French Generals Pasage, Mazillier, du Racas, du Port and Graziani.

On May 6 General Allen went to Paris for a conference with the American Ambassador. He was again in Paris on May 30 to participate in the Memorial Day exercises at the Suresnes cemetery. Only the ordinary ceremonies were held in Coblenz on May 30, as the American dead had been shipped to the United States some time before and the burial of American soldiers in Germany had been discontinued.

From June 21 to 28 another conference of American military attaches was held in Coblenz. It was attended by the military attaches stationed in Turkey and Egypt as well as by those from European capitals. The Military Intelligence Division of the War Department was represented by Major Marlborough Churchill, General Staff, who had been Director of Military Intelligence during the World War.

Some time before the spring of 1921 General Allen, as Commanding General of the A.F.G., had adopted the policy of turning over to the German authorities those Germans who had committed serious crimes. After the adoption of this policy two Germans murdered an American soldier. Upon their apprehension they were handed over to the German authorities for trial. They were sentenced to death and on June 4, 1921, were guillotined in Cologne.

The Black Troop Question.

The French occupation of Frankfurt and other towns in April 1920 was the signal for a bitter campaign in the German press against the colored troops in the French Army of the Rhine. The propaganda was so extensive and so long continued that there was considerable repercussion in the United States. Many protests against the use of "black troops" in the occupation of "white territory" were made to Washington, and on June 23 the Secretary of State telegraphed General Allen as follows:

Department recently in receipt of numerous protests based on reports of alleged mistreatment of German women by French colored colonial troops in occupied territories. Please report briefly by cable and at length by dispatch any available information and also your opinion as to truth of alleged outrages.

On July 2, General Allen sent the following letter to the State Department:

1. In compliance with your cablegram of June 22, 1920, regarding alleged mistreatment of German women by French colored troops, and in elaboration of my cablegram of June 28th, I submit the following report based on a personal investigation conducted by Colonel Le Vert Coleman, C.A.C., American Liaison Officer with the Commanding General of the Allied Forces of Occupation.

2. During the period from January, 1919, to June 1, 1920:

- (a) The average number of negro troops in the French Army of the Rhine was 5,200 men.
- (b) The average number of French colonial troops composed of natives of Africa not of pure negro blood, including distinct races such as Arabs from Algeria, Moroccans, etc., and Negroids,

was 20,000 men. During the entire period from the first day of the occupation in 1918, to the first of June, 1920, 66 cases of alleged rape, attempted rape, sodomy, or attempted sodomy have been officially reported to the French military authorities, against their colored colonial troops in the occupied territories of the Rhinelands. Among these cases, there have been 28 convictions, including several cases where the intent was not fully proved but punishment was given by minor courts corresponding to our Summary and Garrison Courts, for indecent proposals and obscene handling of women and girls against their will. There have been 11 acquittals. There have been 23 investigations leading to trials the results of which have not been published yet. There have been 6 cases where the offenders could not be found. The penalties inflicted have been varied; from ten years at hard labor for aggravated cases of rape, to thirty days in prison for indecent mishandling of women.

3. At the present time, the Senegalese Brigade having all left the Rhinelands between June 1st and 6th, 1920, there actually remains but one regiment of troops of Negroid origin, the First Regiment of Chasseurs Malgaches. There are, however, a few individual Negroes or Negroids in the other French colonial regiments.

4. A very violent newspaper campaign attacking the French colonial troops, especially the Negro troops, broke out simultaneously throughout Germany co-incident with the time of the French evacuation of Frankfurt and Darmstadt and has continued up to the present time. It is unquestionably a fact that many gross exaggerations were circulated in the German press concerning the conduct of the French Colonial troops. The allegations in the German press have been, for the most part, so indefinite as to time and place, and circumstance, as to leave it impracticable to verify the alleged facts, or to disprove them.

5. After all proper allowance is made for the natural difficulties which always are to be expected in tracing crimes of this nature, due to the shame and distress of the victims, the great mass of the articles in the German press, by simultaneous appearance all over Germany and by the failure to cite time, place and circumstances sufficiently clear to enable the truth to be ascertained, give to an impartial observer the impression of an adroit political move which would tend to sow antipathy to France in the other lands of the Allied and Associated powers, especially in America where the Negro question is always capable of arousing feeling.

6. The Rheinische Zeitung, and the Koelnische Volkszeitung recently suspended for publishing attacks on the French colored colonial troops, admit under date of June 15, that they employed certain terms and expressions which they might better have omitted due to the imperfection of the news coming for the most part from outside sources, says the Volkszeitung, and from Berlin says the Rheinische Zeitung. This tends to bear out the opinion noted above, which is further strengthened by dissentent voices in the South German press which protests against exaggerated accusations by other German papers against colored French troops.

7. These exaggerated attacks in the German press outside of the Rhineland have, in several cases, been refuted by responsible officials (German) and citizens of the Rhinelands.

Herr Kohler, Mayor of Worms, and Herr Bischoff, Police Commissioner of Worms, referring to the Senegalese troops, report to the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, that with the exception of one incident, the Senegalese troops in Worms have not committed any misdemeanor and have been under perfect discipline during their entire stay in Worms.

Herr Levy from Kreuznach, and several Germans have written open letters protesting against what they term unfair exaggerations in the German press against the troops.

8. Among gross exaggerations in the German press may be cited the following:

(a) Claim that there are 40,000 colored French troops in the Palatinate.

(b) Claim that Frankfurt was occupied by 20,000 men entirely formed of Negro (Senegalese) troops. French official report shows that no Senegalese occupied Frankfurt, but first Moroccan and Algerian Tirailleurs and later French troops. (White).

(c) Numerous atrocities in the Saar, where young women are said to have been forcibly abducted, raped, mutilated, killed and their bodies thrown into manure piles. The Burgemeister of Saarbrucken, the inspector of the Caserne Potain, Herr Welsch, proprietor of the manure pile. Wilhelm Roth, caretaker, Herr Geppert, employee, have all given written and oral testimony wholly refuting the accusations.

(d) Claim of the German press that large numbers of young Austrian girls who had come to the vicinity of Mainz to get away from the famine in Austria, were raped. The Austrian Government is reported to have made an investigation through its consular service and to have found that not a single such case had occurred.

(e) Claims in the Nauen Radio Service on April 29, 1920, that the working people of Alsace-Lorraine had protested demanding the removal of the Moroccan Division from Alsace Lorraine, when there was no part of these troops in Alsace-Lorraine.

(f) Investigation by Colonel Bonvialle, commanding the 12th Tirailleurs, May 21, 1920, concerning charges of sodomy near Euskirchen, with medical report indicates that the charges could not be sustained.

9. On the other hand, undoubtedly many instances have occurred where women or girls have been assaulted and some where boys and men have been sodomized by members of the French colored colonial troops. See report above as to the official figures. There are undoubtedly cases which are not included in the official figures due to the natural desire to keep out of obscene notoriety. For example, a case of attempted assault was reported June 14th, 1920, from Saarbrucken which is not included in the French official figures. Some cases will never come to light due to the natural feeling of shame of the women concerned, but they are, in my opinion, cases such as generally occur in any land when soldiery is for a long time quartered upon the population.

10. The impression gained from contact with and observing the French colonial troops is that, as a general rule, they are quiet, orderly and well behaved. Discipline has purely relative value and is hardly of the same order as that which we would require. That the discipline of the Senegalese Brigade was not always good, is established by the incidents which recently occurred at Marseilles, when a part of these troops committed serious infractions of discipline when ordered aboard their transport.

11. The attitude of certain classes of German women towards the colored troops has been such as to incite trouble. On account of the very unsettled economic conditions, and for other causes growing out of the world war, prostitution is abnormally engaged in, and many German prostitutes and women of loose character have openly made advances to the colored soldiers, as evidenced by numerous love letters and photographs which are now on file in the official records and which have been sent by German women to colored French soldiers. Several cases have occurred of marriages of German women with French Negro soldiers. One German girl of first-class burgher family, her father a very high city functionary of prominent city in the Rhinelands, recently procured a passport to rejoin her fiance in Marseilles. He was a Negro sergeant. Other Negro soldiers have had French wives and the color line

is not regarded either by the French or the Germans as we regard it in America; to keep the white race pure. At Ludwigshafen, when the 7th Tirailleurs left for Frankfurt, patrols had to be sent out to drive away the German women from the barracks, where they were kissing the colored troops through the window gratings.

Conclusions:

1. The wholesale atrocities by French Negro colonial troops alleged in the German press, such as the alleged abductions, followed by rape, mutilation, murder and concealment of the bodies of the victims, are false and intended for political propaganda.

2. A number of cases of rape, attempted rape, sodomy, attempted sodomy, and obscene mishandling of women and girls, have occurred on the part of French Negro colonial troops in the Rhineland. These cases have been occasional and in restricted numbers, not general or widespread. The French military authorities have repressed them severely in most cases and have made a very serious effort to stamp the evil out. The amount of evidence necessary to convict in such cases is very delicate matter to express opinion upon. However, the number of acquittals is not large and there is nothing surprising about these acquittals except in one case where a girl of fourteen years was known carnally. In this case the acquittal followed upon the claim that the girl was consenting.

3. As a rule the number of convictions and the thoroughness of the reports of the investigations and trials indicates the very earnest effort of the French trial authorities to do justice and to stamp out the evil by stern repressive measures. That their sentences are often milder than ours would be, is largely due to extenuating circumstances found in the evidence according to their rules of evidence which are very different from ours, and to the fact that, in general, French courts do not punish these crimes as severely as American and English Courts do.

4. The discipline of the Senegalese Tirailleurs was not always good as evidenced by the refusal of some of them to get aboard transports at Marseilles when ordered to Syria.

This report was given to the American press from which it was copied into European newspapers. German papers published disparagements of the accuracy of General Allen's information,

and some alleged that the report showed him to have been unduly influenced "by French propoganda and by his own Francophile feelings". The violence of the "Black Shame" campaign subsided in the late summer, but it was not abandoned, and the propoganda continued in the United States as well as in Germany.

Another press campaign occurred in the spring and early summer of 1921. As before there was much exaggeration concerning the conduct of the colored troops, and in a way the propoganda put forth by the Germans caused a reaction of feeling, even in Germany itself. Some of the German newspapers printed articles stating that the situation was by no means as bad as had been painted, and a number of protests against the campaign were made.

The agitation in 1921 became particularly intense after the publication of a report that three regiments of Negroes had reinforced the French Army of the Rhine. The facts were as set forth in the following extract from a letter written by General Allen to the State Department on April 21:

The French Rhine Army has recently been reenforced by three regiments of colonial infantry. The reenforcing regiments are the 66th Regiment of Colonial Infantry, (all Moroccans), the 34th Regiment of Colonial Infantry (2 battalions of whites and 1 battalion of Madagascans), and the 42nd Regiment of Colonial Infantry, (1 battalion of whites and 2 battalions of Madagascans). I am officially informed that the three battalions of Madagascans which arrived recently in the Occupied Territories are to take over the training of the class of 1921, and that they will leave in June. The population tends to confuse the Madagascans with Senegalese negroes and rumors have been circulating that there are three regiments of negroes in the Occupied Territories. The Madagascans who are in the Rhineland are usually known as "Malgaches",

but they are negroes with an infusion of Malay blood. There are also some negroes scattered among the various colonial troops stationed in the Occupied Territories. The 34th and 42nd Regiments of Colonial Infantry are in the same division with a regiment of Senegalese negroes, a fact which may explain why the Madagascan units are identified with negro units by the population. The regiment of Senegalese negroes referred to has not been sent to the Rhineland, but is still stationed in France. The total number of colonial troops, yellow and black, chiefly yellow, now in the Occupied Territories is 27,500.

In August 1920 the German Commissioner for the Occupied Territories had sent to the High Commission a note which made certain allegations concerning the conduct of the colored troops. The following reply was made on April 15, 1921, over the signature of M. Tirard, President of the High Commission:

I have the honor to send you herein the result of the inquiries made with respect to the memoranda which you sent to the High Commission concerning black troops.

The High Commission first observed that these memoranda only contained 138 accusations during a period which extended over two years, while the strength of the troops against whom the charges were made at certain times, namely during the Armistice, reached a total of about 30,000 men.

On the other hand, out of the 138 accusations, 5 cases concern European French soldiers, 3 cases concern sentinels acting in accordance with their orders, 49 cases were shown to be completely unfounded, 51 were not sufficiently supported by evidence to warrant trial, 30 were considered sufficiently supported to warrant trial (20 of these 30 cases were offenses against morals). Of the cases tried, 13 resulted in conviction, including 4 sentences of imprisonment for terms exceeding five years; 2 cases resulted in acquittal; 7 led to disciplinary punishment; 2 cases were dismissed because of lack of evidence.

While the above figures demonstrate with what rigorous severity the military authorities acted when the complaints were shown to be well-founded, they demonstrate also the incredible carelessness shown in the collection of the documentary evidence, which formed the basis not only of your memoranda but also of the German press campaign

against the black troops.

Further: certain charges were fabricated in every particular by the German officials.

The High Commission decided, by way of a first example, to take punitive measures against the Ludwigshafen official who was responsible for inventing the cases of EMLICH, SCHEY, GREIM, SCHON, and HUGO, as there can be no doubt whatsoever as to these cases since the pretended victims are non-existent.

The High Commission requests you to furnish at the earliest possible date the name of the author of these charges (the author of the report which figures on pages 104-108 of the memorandum of 8th July).

As in 1920, the campaign had subsided by autumn, and only occasional references to the colored troops were made after that time. The American press had published articles on the subject, but there too the agitation died away.

During both years the French press had taken up the cudgels against the German propaganda. An issue was made of the word "black", the French papers asserting that there were no black troops in Germany, and a considerable splitting of hairs developed. The facts were as shown above. There were actually no negro organizations stationed in the Rhineland. But there were some negroid organizations and the other colored units contained numerous individuals of purely negro blood as well as many negroids. It was estimated by Colonel Coleman, who made a thorough investigation of the matter, that in June 1921 from 12 to 15 per cent of the Colonial troops in the French Army of the Rhine were "pure Negroes or approximately pure Negroes".

While it was realized that the German propaganda against the colored troops had over-reached itself and that their conduct had not been as bad as was claimed, the Americans in the

Rhineland were, in general, inclined to sympathize with the feelings of the German population. They preserved a correct attitude in the matter and refrained from open expressions of their views, but they were strongly of the opinion that from all points of view it was unwise to utilize semi-civilized colored troops, whether brown or black, as an occupying force in the territory of a civilized white people. And it was certain that the presence and conduct of the colored troops in the Rhineland aroused a more intense hatred of the French by the German people.

The Bergdoll Case.

Among the most notorious of those who evaded the draft during the World War was Grover Cleveland Bergdoll, of a wealthy German-American family of Philadelphia. He was captured in January 1920 and in the following March was tried by court martial and sentenced to five years' confinement. In May, 1920, having been given permission to visit his home in order to settle some business affairs, he succeeded in escaping, and for months no trace of him was found. His escape created quite a furor in the United States and a scandal was more than hinted at.

In October 1920 the American Headquarters received information that Bergdoll was living in Eberbach, a small town in unoccupied Germany, near Heidelberg in the state of Baden and not far from the perimeter of the Mainz bridgehead.¹ Efforts

¹He had fled to Canada where he secured a British passport. By way of England and Holland he had reached Eberbach in the vicinity of which his ancestors had lived.

were then instituted to bring about his arrest and delivery to the American military authorities at Coblenz, G-2 (the Intelligence Section) being entrusted with the case as it had occurred in unoccupied Germany.

The matter was first taken up with the German Military Commission² which immediately telegraphed the Baden authorities, stating that the American Headquarters desired the arrest and extradition of Bergdoll and his companion, one Stecher, an American of unsavory reputation, who was said to have helped Bergdoll to escape and to be the latter's body guard. The Baden authorities declined to act in the matter on the ground that Bergdoll had never been a soldier and so did not come within the purview of the Armistice Agreement, which provided that deserters or absentees from the Armies of Occupation should be delivered to them by the German authorities. It was further stated that Bergdoll had applied for German citizenship and had said that he had evaded the draft because he did not wish to fight against the country of his ancestors. The War Department was informed of the case and was requested to secure the intervention of the State Department. Having been informed that "the State Department was not inclined to make overtures for the delivery of Bergdoll", the Coblenz Headquarters decided to make no further efforts at the time. The matter was allowed to lie dormant until early in December when work on the case was again begun.

In the meantime dispatches from the War Department had shown it to be greatly interested in the case, and directions

²Volume II, Chapter 18.

to make every effort to capture Bergdoll had been received from the Chief of Staff of the Army.

The cooperation of the Secret Service of the French Army of the Rhine was secured and careful plans were made. The general scheme was to entice him to enter the occupied territory, particularly the French area, and there arrest him. As a last resort, an attempt to "shanghai" him would be made; only Germans were to be used in unoccupied Germany, as the Americans entrusted with the case were well aware of the international complications that might ensue should Americans be caught in an attempt forcibly to arrest a person beyond the limits of the occupied territories.

Frequent information of Bergdoll's life in Eberbach was received, the system was working smoothly, and both Americans and French had high hopes of success within a few weeks at the most, when on January 22, 1921, an unfortunate incident occurred and put an end to hopes of the early apprehension of Bergdoll.

Acting under the mistaken authority of their immediate superior officers and contrary to the instructions of the Commanding General, two American operatives of the Provost Marshal's Department (Division of Criminal Investigation), proceeded to Eberbach and there endeavored forcibly to arrest Bergdoll and remove him to the American area. Bergdoll resisted, and one of the operatives fired his pistol, wounding a German girl in the hand. The operatives were then overpowered, one of them being rather badly beaten by the excited crowd, and the two were placed in jail.

As soon as the news was received at Coblenz, General

Allen realized that an international incident had happened. Through his Deputy, Colonel Stone, and the German Commissioner, he informed the German and Baden Governments that the attempt to arrest Bergdoll had been made without his knowledge or authority, expressed his apologies and requested the return of the two operatives to his jurisdiction. No reply to this verbal message was received from either the German or the Baden Government.

The incident created some excitement in Baden and caused considerable comment in the German press and in the Reichstag, as well as in newspapers in the United States.

General Allen sent his Judge Advocate to Baden to investigate the case and to request the return of the prisoners. This action brought no results other than information that the operatives would be tried. Another staff officer (a member of G-2) was sent to visit the prisoners at Mosbach whither they had been removed. He reported that they were well taken care of and there seemed no chance of their release before trial.

The Paris edition of the "Chicago Tribune" endeavored to make a sensation of the affair, and succeeded to some extent. It demanded the return of the men, failing which it called on the United States Government to order troops from the A.F.G. to proceed to Baden and forcibly release the prisoners. The paper alleged that the men were suffering from ill treatment and lack of food, and for some time it carried sensational front page articles dealing with the case. The Chicago edition joined in the campaign and with other American newspapers succeeded in inciting many posts of the American Legion to

make demands upon the United States Government to bring necessary pressure to bear and cause the early release of the two men.

The unfortunate affair caused much embarrassment to General Allen and the War Department. Sensational newspapers and their unthinking readers did not realize that the act of the two operatives was indefensible from an international point of view. Aside from the fact that their action in Eberbach had constituted a technical violation of the Armistice, it was clear that Americans had no more right to make an arrest in unoccupied Germany than Germans had to take a similar step in the United States.

After making arrangements to ensure the fair trial of the two men and to see to their comfort, General Allen continued his endeavors to have them released. He sent a representative to Berlin to put the case before high officials of the Government. They averred their desire to have the two men released, but said that the Central Government was powerless. The Baden Government had complete control of the case and would consider intervention from Berlin as an intrusion upon its prerogatives. Under the Germany system (and more particularly because of the political insecurity of the German Cabinet?) the Central Government could do nothing until the prisoners had been tried. After trial, the officials hoped, arrangements for the release of the men could be made.¹

¹It was interesting and enlightening to Americans to find that the political theory of States' Rights was a fact in Germany and that the German States were as jealous of their prerogatives as ever had been Virginia or South Carolina.

It was the impression of the G-2 officer who visited the prisoners in Baden and conferred with the officials there that the Baden Government was "standing on its dignity" and was inclined to use the incident as a means of exploiting its own ends with the Central Government. He was told that the prisoners were under the control of the judicial branch of the Baden Government and that until their trial had been completed, the executive branch could take no steps toward their release.

No active assistance was extended by the American Commissioner in Berlin or the State Department. But General Allen did not let the matter rest. Through G-2 and the American Military Observer in Berlin he continued to bring to the attention of high Government officials his desire for the early release of the two operatives. This method resulted in the receipt of advice as to the best legal defense to be made when the case came to trial and in the practical assurance that the men would be pardoned soon after the trial, which was scheduled to occur early in March.

General Allen decided that he would not take official cognizance of the trial and so would not assign a Judge Advocate to defend the men. Competent legal assistance was to be secured for their defense, but the lawyer would have no official connection with the American Army. At this juncture a member of the Paris Post of the American Legion, a former officer who had served with the Army of Occupation in 1919, arrived in Coblenz. He reported that he had been sent to make arrangements for retaining a lawyer to defend the men, and that sufficient funds for the purpose had been contributed by the American

Legion. He placed himself at the disposal of General Allen and together with G-2 made all necessary arrangements for the defense. The prisoners were visited and furnished with supplies of smoking material, reading matter, etc.

One of the operatives, an ex-soldier, cabled to President-elect Harding that he was "kept mistreated in German jail without help from Coblenz". The matter was referred to General Allen by the War Department, with a request for information as to the status of the case. As a result of the close touch he had maintained with the two men, General Allen was able to show that the complaint was unfounded. He cabled the War Department that both before and after the men had cabled his complaint, he had stated specifically to the G-2 officer who visited him that he had no complaint to make.

The trial of the two men took place at Mosbach on March 21, 1921. A G-2 officer was present as the unofficial representative of General Allen, and several American press correspondents attended the proceedings. The atmosphere of the courtroom and of the town was distinctly hostile. Bergdoll and Stecher were witnesses and were not restrained from insulting and abusing the two prisoners and Americans in general. The prosecuting attorney made a violent attack on the Armies of Occupation, particularly the A.F.G., and cited the attempted arrest as an example of "the overbearing attitude of the victor". While the presiding judge "hypocritically endeavored to produce an impression of impartiality", he made no attempt to prevent the frequent hostile and insulting remarks of the spectators and witnesses. The counsel for the prisoners made

what was characterized as a "brilliant defense", but it was apparent from the beginning that the American operatives would be convicted.

Maef, the civilian operative, who had been in charge of the attempted arrest and had fired his pistol, was sentenced to eighteen months confinement for "unauthorized assumption of authority, coercion and accidental injury". Being a "concurring punishment" the sentence was automatically reduced to fifteen months' confinement. Zimmer, a sergeant, was acquitted of "cooperation" and sentenced to six months' confinement for "assisting in the unauthorized assumption of authority and coercion". Several Germans, who had been employed to assist in the arrest and abduction of Bergdoll and who were tried at the same time, received sentences ranging from six to eleven months' confinement.

While the sentences of the two Americans seemed severe for the offenses cited, it was evident that the influence of higher authority had prevented more serious charges from being preferred.

After having received a report of the trial and the sentences imposed, General Allen, through the same channels as before, brought the matter to the attention of high Berlin officials who assured him that they were doing everything in their power to secure the release of the two Americans. General Allen then referred to their previous statements and inquired as to when he might expect the release of the prisoners. The next day he received the following cablegram from the War Department:

The Secretary of War directs that you bring to a conclusion your negotiations for the release of Zimmer and Naef by making formal application to the proper German authorities for their immediate release. You should impress upon the German Government that the matter is urgent. Report by cable action taken by you and developments as they occur.

General Allen then cabled the War Department that he was dispatching a staff officer to Berlin with a note for the German Government and that he had just received information from the German Commissioner that the early release of the two men was expected.

The above cablegram from the War Department was the first intervention of the United States Government in the case. Both the State and the War Departments had been kept fully informed from the beginning, but beyond indications of their interest neither had taken any action.

On March 28 the following note was delivered in person by a staff officer to the German Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Minister being out of the city:

Coblenz, 26 March 1921.

Sir:

I am directed by my Government to bring to a conclusion my negotiations relative to the American prisoners, Naef and Zimmer, and to request their immediate release.

The delay in releasing these men has made this matter urgent, and my Government therefore directs me to make this formal and earnest application.

I shall be pleased to have acknowledgment of this communication and to be advised of your action at the earliest moment.

Very respectfully

HENRY T. ALLEN
Commanding General
American Forces in Germany.

To
The Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Berlin, Germany.

On March 30, the staff officer returned to Coblenz with
the following communication from the German Foreign Office:

Berlin, 29 March 1921.

Dear Major Bagby:

I beg to acknowledge receipt of
General Allen's letter of March 26. The present
state of the affair is contained in the enclosed
Pro-memoria. I trust that the matter will be
concluded very soon, and I shall not fail to let
you know of the result.

Very truly yours,

E. V. HANIEL.

(enclosure)

FOREIGN OFFICE

A pardon and release of the Americans Naef
and Zimmer is exclusively a matter of the
Baden Government. The Central Government,
however, immediately after the sentence of
these two applied to the Baden Government
for the pardon of the condemned men. The
Prime Minister of Baden also promised to urge
their pardon before the Baden Cabinet. The
Central Government has today asked the Baden
Government to expedite this matter in the
above mentioned sense.

Berlin, 29 March 1921.

The foregoing was immediately cabled to the State and
War Departments. On March 31 the German Commissioner informed
General Allen as follows:

Upon request of the Federal Government
the Baden Government has remitted the sen-
tence in the cases of Naef and Zimmer,
American Nationals, who had been sentenced
to confinement on account of the assault
upon Bergdoll at Eberbach, provided their
future behavior will be good. Naef and
Zimmer will be immediately released from
confinement and will return to Coblenz.

The German Commissioner added that the Foreign Office asked that General Allen "kindly award damages" to the girl (Lina Rupp) who had been shot in the hand and that one or more German prisoners confined by the Americans be released. General Allen replied that those matters would be taken under consideration. Full information was immediately cabled to Washington.

As the two operatives had not reached Coblenz by the afternoon of April 1, General Allen requested the German Commissioner to ascertain the reason for the delay. The following telegram, sent by General Allen to the War Department on April 2, shows the next developments:

German Commissioner hands me telegram from Baden Government showing Naef and Zimmer are not yet released pending receipt of 100,000 marks¹ for girl shot in hand. He intimates German Government powerless in premises. I informed him demand for immediate release was made on Central Government and not on Baden and I would not discuss compensation until prisoners are released. Apparently Bergdoll's money is being used and Baden Government insists on showing independence of Berlin. German Commissioner is impressed with my decision and will give it immediately to Berlin by telephone.

Naef and Zimmer were released at 5 p.m. on April 2 and reached Coblenz early the next morning. With this the incident was closed except with regard to the claim for damages submitted in behalf of Lina Rupp. The sum of 100,000 marks was considered excessive, but it seemed highly probable that the girl (who was 16 years of age) had been deprived of some of her earning capacity. While the A.F.G. had no funds that could be used for the payment of such a claim, General Allen was inclined to forward it to Washington with a recommendation

that a reasonable sum be paid her, provided an examination by his medical officers should confirm the German report as to the extent of her injury. The German Commissioner was requested to inform the girl's attorney of the advisability of her coming to Coblenz for such an examination. As the girl declined to come to Coblenz, the facts were reported to Washington and no further action was taken.²

The Coblenz Headquarters kept in general touch with Bergdoll after April 1921, but made no active attempt to apprehend him. He continued to reside in Baden, and both French and American operatives were instructed to arrest him should he ever enter the occupied territories. The ill-advised attempt to capture him in January 1921 had spoiled practically every chance of his apprehension by the A.F.G., and it seemed that unless the United States Government could induce the German Government to surrender him, it was highly probable that the notorious slacker would remain at liberty.

The Summer of 1921

While this period opened with a widespread agitation for the abolition of the military and economic sanctions, the actual center of public interest was the question of Upper Silesia.

²The matter was finally taken up through diplomatic channels. Early in 1922 a medical officer was sent to Baden to examine the girl and his report was forwarded to the American Embassy at Berlin. He found that the girl's earning capacity had been considerably lessened. Several months later General Allen was directed to send all papers in the case to Washington. It was understood that her claim for damages would be submitted to Congress.

The plebiscite district was evacuated by the belligerent German and Polish organizations on July 7. The decision of the Supreme Council, which was to meet at Paris in early August, was eagerly awaited. In the meantime there was a cessation of disorders, but the population in general remained in a state of unrest and the situation could not yet be deemed satisfactory.

The trial of the war criminals at Leipzig was suspended in July after a number of cases had been concluded. Several were sentenced to terms of imprisonment and several others were acquitted. It was announced that no new cases would be tried until the Supreme Council had acted on the verdicts already adopted. Before the suspension of the sittings the French representatives had been recalled and the Belgians had withdrawn their documentary evidence. The French press was unanimous in denouncing the Leipzig trials as "farfical", but the British press was divided in the issue.

The attitude of the Wirth Cabinet evoked favorable comment in the Allied countries. The first billion gold marks had been paid and the Allied Military Control Commission stated that the disarmament was proceeding satisfactorily. There was much discussion about an extension of the coalition to include representatives of the German People's Party (moderately conservative) in the Cabinet but the plan failed to mature. Much interest was caused by the news that the Government was preparing a new taxation program in order to provide for reparations payments. Reports as to the details of the scheme brought forth protests from many of those who would be affected. There was a slight recurrence of Communist activity, but the end of the period

found the party still weaker.

On July 2 President Harding signed the resolution providing for a separate peace with Germany. Negotiations were instituted at Berlin, and on August 25 the treaty was signed there by Mr. Drosel, the American Commissioner, and Dr. Rosen, the German Foreign Minister. The German press expressed the hope that friendly relations would soon be established and pointed with satisfaction to the fact that the question of war guilt had not been mentioned. The treaty read as follows:

Germany

and

The United States of America:

Considering that the United States, acting in conjunction with its co-belligerents, entered into an armistice with Germany on November 11, 1918, in order that a Treaty of Peace might be concluded;

Considering that the Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919, and came into force according to the terms of its Article 440, but has not been ratified by the United States;

Considering that the Congress of the United States passed a Joint Resolution, approved by the President July 2, 1921, which reads in part as follows:

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled. That the state of war declared to exist between the Imperial German Government and the United States of America by the joint resolution of Congress approved April 6, 1917, is hereby declared at an end.

"Sec. 2. That in making this declaration, and as a part of it, there are expressly reserved to the United States of America and its nationals any and all rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations, or advantages together with the right to enforce the same, to which it or they have become entitled under the terms of the armistice signed November 11, 1918, or any extensions or modifications thereof; or which were acquired by or are in the

possession of the United States of America by reason of its participation in the war or to which its nationals have thereby become rightfully entitled; or which, under the Treaty of Versailles, have been stipulated for its or their benefit; or to which it is entitled as one of the principal allied and associated powers; or to which it is entitled by virtue of any Act or Acts of Congress; or otherwise.

.....
"Sec. 5. All property of the Imperial German Government, or its successor or successors, and of all German nationals, which was, on April 6, 1917, in or has since that date come into the possession or under control of, or has been the subject of a demand by the United States of America or of any of its officers, agents, or employees, from any source or by any agency whatsoever, and all property of the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, or its successor or successors, and of all Austro-Hungarian nationals which was on December 7, 1917, in or has since that date come into the possession or under control of, or has been the subject of a demand by the United States of America or any of its officers, agents, or employees, from any source or by any agency whatsoever, shall be retained by the United States of America and no disposition thereof made, except as shall have been heretofore or specifically hereafter shall be provided by law until such time as the Imperial German Government and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, or their successor or successors, shall have respectively made suitable provision for the satisfaction of all claims against said Governments respectively; of all persons, wheresoever domiciled, who owe permanent allegiance to the United States of America and who have suffered, through the acts of the Imperial German Government, or its agents, or the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, or its agents, since July 31, 1914, loss, damage, or injury to their persons or property, directly or indirectly, whether through the ownership of shares of stock in German, Austro-Hungarian, American, or other corporations, or in consequence of hostilities or of any operations of war, or otherwise, and also shall have granted to persons owing permanent allegiance to the United States of America

most-favored-nation treatment, whether the same be national or otherwise, in all matters affecting residence, business, profession, trade, navigation, commerce and industrial property rights, and until the Imperial German Government, and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, or their successor or successors, shall have respectively confirmed to the United States of America all fines, forfeitures, penalties, and seizures imposed or made by the United States of America during the war, whether in respect to the property of the Imperial German Government or German nationals or the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government or Austro-Hungarian nationals, and shall have waived any and all pecuniary claims against the United States of America".

Being desirous of restoring the friendly relations existing between the two Nations prior to the outbreak of war:

Have for that purpose appointed their plenipotentiaries:

The President of the German Empire
Dr. Friedrich Rosen, Minister for
Foreign Affairs,
and

The President of the United States of America
Ellis Loring Dresel, Commissioner of
the United States of America to Germany,

Who, having communicated their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I

Germany undertakes to accord to the United States, and the United States shall have and enjoy, all the rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages specified in the aforesaid Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United States of July 2, 1921, including all the rights and advantages stipulated for the benefit of the United States in the Treaty of Versailles which the United States shall fully enjoy notwithstanding the fact that such Treaty has not been ratified by the United States.

Article II

With a view to defining more particularly the obligations of Germany under the foregoing Article with respect to certain provisions in

the Treaty of Versailles, it is understood and agreed between the High Contracting Parties;

(1) That the rights and advantages stipulated in that Treaty for the benefit of the United States, which it is intended the United States shall have and enjoy, are those defined in Section 1, of Part IV, and Parts V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIV, and XV.

The United States in availing itself of the rights and advantages stipulated in the provisions of that Treaty mentioned in this paragraph will do so in a manner consistent with the rights accorded to Germany under such provisions.

(2) That the United States shall not be bound by the provisions of Part I of that Treaty, nor by any provisions of that Treaty including those mentioned in Paragraph (1) of this Article, which relate to the Covenant of the League of Nations, nor shall the United States be bound by any action taken by the League of Nations, or by the Council or by the Assembly thereof, unless the United States shall expressly give its assent to such action.

(3) That the United States assumes no obligations under or with respect to the provisions of Part II, Part III, Sections 2 to 8 inclusive of Part IV, and Part XIII of that Treaty.

(4) That, while the United States is privileged to participate in the Reparation Commission, according to the terms of Part VIII of that Treaty, and in any other Commission established under the Treaty or under any agreement supplemental thereto, the United States is not bound to participate in any such commission unless it shall elect to do so.

(5) That the periods of time to which reference is made in Article 440 of the Treaty of Versailles shall run, with respect to any act or election on the part of the United States, from the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

Article III

The present Treaty shall be ratified in accordance with the constitutional forms of the High Contracting Parties and shall take effect immediately on the exchange of ratifications which shall take place as soon as possible in Berlin.

In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty and have

hereunto affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate in Berlin this twenty-fifth day of August, 1921.

Rosen
Ellis Loring Dresel

The murder of Mathias Erzberger¹ on August 26, caused a political crisis that for a time occupied the center of the stage. The entire German press expressed indignation and fear of grave political developments. Great excitement ensued. The parties of the Left and a large portion of the Centrum declared the crime to have been a political murder, and their newspapers engaged in a violent attack against "the Bolshevists of the Right", some predicting a new revolution. So serious was the situation that the President decreed the suspension of publications the contents of which tended to incite the overthrow of the Government and of meetings and demonstrations should there be apprehension that the debates might be of the same tenor. Several papers of the Right were immediately suspended, and the Government instituted a campaign against the monarchists in general. Throughout Germany, there were demonstrations of protest against the murder and the "ceaseless agitation and unscrupulous methods of the Right",

¹Erzberger was a member of the Centrum Party and a stormy petrel of German politics. He introduced the famous peace resolution in 1917 and after the revolution, as the Chief of the German plenipotentiaries, signed the Armistice Agreement. He became Minister of Finance in 1919 and in 1920 was forced to resign because of disclosures relative to his conduct of that office. Because of the general antipathy against him, he did not hold high office afterwards. However, taking up with the Socialists, he remained a power in German political life.

that in Berlin bringing together the largest assemblage since the revolution of 1918. The repressive measures of the Government were well received except in Bavaria, where much resentment was expressed and relations with Berlin became strained. Much opposition was expressed by papers of the Right in various parts of Germany, but the Presidential decree was enforced, and even in Bavaria several papers were suspended. A revival of open class hatred developed. In a number of places mobs entered public and private buildings and destroyed everything they could find that related to the old order of things¹. Heated discussions in the press continued for some time, but no serious disorders developed, and by the end of September the political atmosphere was again comparatively quiet.

The tense relations between the National and Bavarian Governments was one of the outstanding events of domestic politics during the summer. The resentment caused by the Presidential decree mentioned above was greatly increased by demands from Berlin for the raising of the state of siege which had long been in force in Bavaria. The Bavarians took the stand that the control of the press and of meetings and demonstrations was a matter for Bavaria alone - that Bavaria should be governed from Munich and not from Berlin. The same principle applied to the preservation of order, and the question of the continuance or ending of the state of siege could be decided by the Bavarian Government without intervention

¹Instances of this kind occurred in the French bridgeheads of Mainz.

from Berlin. In 1919 parts of Bavaria, including Munich, had been ruled by a so-called Soviet government, and that state did not care to run chances of a second experience of the kind. But very recently there had been a great Socialist and Communist demonstration in Munich; under the pretext of protesting against the high cost of living, the assemblages had advocated the overthrow of the existing government. Incited by the steadily increasing cost of living, the population was "gradually becoming alarmed", and Bavaria could not dispense with martial law. Negotiations between Bavaria and Berlin were instituted. The results of these negotiations, which were in the nature of a compromise, were rejected by the Bavarian Cabinet which resigned after the Assembly and disapproved the rejection. The new Cabinet, composed largely of members of the old but with a new Premier, took a more moderate view of the controversy with Berlin, accepted the compromise and promised to raise the state of siege. By the end of the period relations with the National Government were normal once more.

The Supreme Council met at Paris on August 8.¹ The Germans were tensely interested in the outcome, particularly with regard to Upper Silesia, and great was their disappointment when, unable to reach a decision upon Upper Silesia, the Supreme Council referred the question to the League of Nations. Both the Polish and the German elements were disappointed over the delay in reaching a decision and complained of "terrorism"

¹The United States looked upon the Upper Silesian question as a strictly European affair and did not participate officially in the meetings.

by armed bands, but leaders of both sides exhorted their partisans to preserve order until the final decision was reached. The population in general, seemingly weary of disturbances, remained passive. The Allied reinforcements, the dispatch of which had been decided upon some time before, arrived in the plebiscite district, but no occasion for their intervention arose. The decision of the League of Nations was eagerly awaited, but up to the end of September practically no outward manifestations of excitement had occurred.

During the summer of 1921 economic conditions in Germany were better than at any time since the revolution of 1918. Towards the end of the summer food prices commenced to rise after having decreased appreciably earlier in the season, but it remained true that the average family had been better off with regard to the necessities of life than for long before. In July the effects of the troubles in Upper Silesia had caused a coal shortage; by the end of September the shortage had been relieved. While there were many strikes and lockouts, the number of unemployed was far less than during the spring months. Industrial activity increased throughout Germany, the depreciation of the mark (from 75 to the dollar on July 1 to 117 on September 30) greatly stimulated the export trade, and a number of ships were added to the German merchant marine. The Wiesbaden Agreement between France and Germany, providing for reparations deliveries in kind, was signed in August and caused satisfaction in Germany. In September an economic agreement with Italy was concluded; this promised to prove of much benefit to German trade. Many fears

of an impending financial collapse were expressed and Germany's economic problem remained difficult and far from solution. But in the final analysis the conditions of life in the summer of 1921 were considerably easier for the average German than they had been since the Allied and Associated armies first set foot upon German soil.

Generally similar economic conditions prevailed in the occupied territories, although the cost of living was higher there, particularly in the American area, than in unoccupied Germany. But there were many less strikes in the occupied territories and the population was not subjected to the agitation and excitement that occurred from time to time in the interior. Low water in the Rhine caused a congestion in shipping, despite the ending of the tug-boat strike in early July. This factor, together with the diverting of Ruhr coal to unoccupied Germany in order to make up the deficit arising from the decreased deliveries from Upper Silesia, brought about a coal shortage in the Rhineland. But the Allies reduced the monthly reparations deliveries by approximately 30% and the Upper Silesian mines increased their output, the abolition of the economic sanctions resulted in a renewed activity among the industries and the grain and potato crops proved very good. All things considered the Rhinelanders' conditions of life were at least as good as those in unoccupied Germany; and for him, too, the summer of 1921 was, by comparison with those of 1919 and 1920, a prosperous season.

At its August meeting the Supreme Council had decided to maintain the military sanctions but to abolish the economic

measures on September 15. The latter action was to be dependent upon the payment on August 31 of one billion gold marks by Germany and upon that country's agreement to the establishment of an Allied license control system in the Rhineland. The German press voiced considerable objection to these provisos and to the failure to provide for the withdrawal of the troops from Duesseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort. It had been hoped that the sanctions would be entirely removed, and much disappointment was expressed. At the same time industrial circles contemplated the early removal of the customs barrier with uncooled satisfaction. Germany paid the required one billion gold marks, but as the Government failed to agree to the license control system until late in September, the customs sanctions were not removed until September 30. The additional French and Belgian troops, brought up in the spring, then commenced to withdraw to their respective countries.

While the United States did not participate in the application of the sanctions, General Allen, in his capacity as American Representative with the High Commission, was frequently called upon in the meetings of that body to give his opinions in the matter. He believed that as the sanctions were alleged to have been adopted as coercive measures they should have been abolished as soon as their purported object had been achieved. In May the Germans had accepted the Allied ultimatum, and therefore there was no longer any reason for maintaining the sanctions. He claimed also that the economic sanctions were harmful rather than beneficial to Allied interests as they

lessened Germany's ability to pay the reparations demands.¹ It transpired that the British and Belgian High Commissioners agreed with General Allen's views, while the French High Commissioner adhered to the opinion that the sanctions should be continued in force.

The Allied license control system did not commence operations during the period. The High Commission had been entrusted with its organization, but could not come to an agreement. General Allen believed that it might prove injurious to American trade. He succeeded in having an American member placed on the committee assigned to organize and conduct the system, and he took effective steps to prevent discrimination against American goods.

The population of the American area remained orderly throughout the period, and there were no outward manifestations of excitement over the various events in unoccupied Germany. There was an infiltration of Communist influence, but it proved of no practical importance. The local Socialist papers took part in the campaign against the reactionaries that occurred after the murder of Erzberger, and heated discussions took place between them and papers of the opposite persuasion. The local political parties were not active until towards the end of the period.

There was a revival of separatist activity in the southern portion of the Rhineland and several meetings were held in other

¹In fact it seemed that the occupation of the Rhineland was also harmful rather than beneficial to the reparations interests of the Allies, as it too lessened Germany's ability to pay.

localities, but the movement made practically no progress. Dr. Dorten came to Coblenz to attend a meeting and was called before the American military authorities. He was directed to abstain from any speeches that would tend to cause excitement and so interfere with the preservation of order. He promised to comply with these instructions and took advantage of the opportunity to declare himself as favoring the separation of the Rhineland from Prussia but not from Germany. He was informed that the Americans were not concerned with the internal politics of Germany except in so far as they might affect the maintenance of order, and it was reiterated that the American authorities would not permit a change in the local government by other than constitutional means. Dorten did not attend the scheduled meeting which was attended by a very small number of people, and he left the area on the following day.

In September a tremendous explosion occurred in the chemical works at Oppau, near Ludwigshafen in the French zone. Over 400 were killed, the total casualties approaching 1000 in number. Help was immediately extended by the French Army of the Rhine, and expressions of sympathy were made by the High Commission and the various military commanders.

July 4 was celebrated throughout the area, the program being similar to that of 1920. The French national holiday on July 14 was marked by the usual salutes and the decoration with the fourragere of the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Field Artillery and Companies A, B, and D of the 1st Engineers - a graceful act of the French. The Belgian holiday was celebrated on July 21 with ceremonies similar to those of the previous year.

In July a delegation of Spanish officers visited the area, and several days later a number of French naval officers, headed by Admiral Katye of the Superior Naval War College, came to Coblenz and were extended the usual courtesies. Other visitors during the summer were General Degoutte; Lord Hardinge, the British Ambassador to France; Senators McKinley of Illinois, Walsh of Montana and Robinson of Arkansas; Representatives Brooks, Barkley and Montague; General Oskar Paul Enckel, Chief of Staff of the Army of Finland; M. Loucheur, French Minister of the Liberated Regions; and the former French Premiers Rene Viviani and Georges Leygues.

In July a committee of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the members of which were studying business and political conditions in Europe, visited Coblenz at the invitation of General Allen, remaining for two days. The members, all prominent in the American business world, were as follows:

- Mr. Joseph H. Defrees, President of
the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.;
- Mr. John H. Fahy of Boston;
- Mr. R. F. Lamont of Chicago;
- Mr. E. A. Filenb of Boston;
- Mr. Silas H. Strawn of Chicago;
- Mr. John J. O'Connor of Washington.

The delegation displayed a keen interest in conditions in the Rhineland, the policies of the American authorities and the relations of the latter with the Allied and German authorities. Under the instructions of General Allen the members of his staff, of both the A.F.G. and the High Commission, as well as he himself, discussed matters very frankly with the delegation and endeavored to furnish it with an accurate picture of actual conditions. The delegation was greatly interested in the policies

and intentions of the Allied countries and of Germany as they appeared to the Americans on the Rhine. in the probable effects of these policies upon European peace and American trade, and in the effect upon all countries concerned of a withdrawal of the A.F.G. and the American representation with the High Commission. The delegation departed for Berlin with expressions of appreciation and of a belief that the return of normal conditions in Europe and in American trade therewith would be much delayed by an early withdrawal of the Americans from occupied Germany. After returning to the United States the delegation conferred with the Secretary of State and published a lengthy report in which the views mentioned above were embodied.

A company of infantry was sent to Flirey, France, in August to attend the dedication of a monument to the American Expeditionary Forces, presented by the French Government.

The maneuvers of the "A.F.G. Division" were held from September 23 to 30. General Pershing was present on several days, and at the conclusion of the maneuvers he inspected and reviewed all combat troops and their horse and motor transportation. The command was assembled on the Weissenthurm Flying Field, and it proved the last occasion upon which all troops of the A.F.G. were assembled together.

General Pershing, now Chief of Staff as well as General of the Armies of the United States, spent a week as the guest of General Allen, during which he made a thorough inspection of the varied activities of the A.F.G.

In July General Allen proceeded to London for a conference with the Hon. George Harvey, American Ambassador to

England. General Allen attended the meeting of the Supreme Council in August, carrying with him special reports, drawn up by his staff, on matters bearing upon the Upper Silesian question and the sanctions. His position at the Supreme Council was that of special adviser to Mr. Harvey (whose status was that of an observer for the United States), but he participated in a number of conferences held outside of the meetings of the Supreme Council and gave his considered views on the subjects within his special field. During the middle of September General Allen made a cruise of several days in the Baltic on the American battleship "Utah", visiting Copenhagen enroute to board the vessel. Debarking at Danzig, he proceeded to Berlin where he conferred with the American Commissioner and several members of the German Government.

The Last Quarter of 1921.

The leading domestic issues were now the proposed extension of the coalition cabinets, both of the Nation and of Prussia, and the troublesome question of Upper Silesia. In both cabinets only three parties - Majority Socialist, Centrum and Democratic - were represented. The existence of each cabinet was very insecure, and it was desired to strengthen each by the addition of members of other parties. All efforts thus to broaden the basis of the National Cabinet failed, but before the end of the period success was achieved in the Prussian Cabinet, and with four parties represented it became relatively much stronger.

The decision of the Council of the League of Nations, in the

matter of Upper Silesia was delivered to Germany on October 20. It provided for a partition of the industrial district, the most important and valuable portion of which was awarded to Poland. A "Mixed Upper Silesian Commission" was to guarantee the economic unity of the district and to adjust economic matters there during a period of transition which was to last fifteen years, and an agreement to this effect was to be concluded between Germany and Poland. There were violent protests throughout Germany, demonstrations were held at Berlin and other large cities, and the situation in Upper Silesia again became tense. As a result of the decision, the Wirth Cabinet resigned on October 22. The political parties were unable to agree upon a basis for a new coalition in the Government, and Dr. Wirth was again entrusted with the formation of a Cabinet. The Democrats consented to the retention of Dr. Gessler, Minister of National Defense, a Democrat, but otherwise would not participate unless the German People's Party were represented in the Cabinet. This left only the Centrum and the Majority Socialists represented in the new Government; as the Cabinet was not supported by a majority it was called an "Administrative Cabinet". While the new Cabinet entered upon its duties on October 26, several vacancies were left unfilled, particularly that of Foreign Minister, and it had not been completely formed by the end of the year. Chancellor Wirth again declared his policy to be one of "fulfillment".

There was much talk of a rejection of the decision relative to Upper Silesia. October 22 was celebrated as a national day of mourning, although the Socialist parties did not participate, and public amusements were suspended for 24 hours.

The German Government protested that the awarding of Upper Silesian territory to Poland violated the principles of self-determination, but in view of the threats of the Allies of adopting "such measures as might be deemed necessary to insure the provisions of the Geneva verdict", the decision was accepted. Upper Silesia remained comparatively quiet, although complaints of "terrorism" continued to be made by both sides. Negotiations between the Germans and Poles were instituted, and by the end of the period it was announced that an economic agreement had been reached.

Ex-King Ludwig of Bavaria died in Hungary in October. His funeral took place at Munich early in November and was the occasion for a huge royalist demonstration. There were no disturbances in Bavaria, as the working classes maintained an attitude of reserve. In other parts of Germany the Socialists staged demonstrations in opposition to the royalist agitation as well as in celebration of the third anniversary of the revolution of 1918. They announced that they were on the alert with regard to reactionary tendencies and there was much discussion in the press of the Right and Left, but no untoward incident occurred.

After the lifting of the state of siege in Bavaria on October 15, friction with the Central Government ceased, to be renewed before the end of the month when the National Minister of Justice announced that his department would inspect a certain prison in Bavaria. The Reichstag passed a bill at that effect, but soon revoked it because of protests from Bavaria. The friction was lessened towards the end of the period, but as the question of Bavaria's prerogatives remained a live issue, tense relations

with the Central Government might develop at any time.

The failure of Ex-Emperor Carl to regain the throne of Hungary by his attempted coup was welcomed by all parties in Germany. Even the monarchists were opposed to a restoration of the Hapsburgs, as they feared that it would greatly endanger the ultimate fusion of Austria with Germany.

There was a revival of Communist activity in November when about 100 Communists, who were serving prison sentences for participation in the March disorders, went on a hunger strike. The Communist Party attempted to exploit the incident and were alleged to have been responsible for the unemployed riots that occurred in November. The Government refused to release the hunger strikers and the riots were sharply repressed by the police. The agitation continued, however, and in December, pending further investigation of their sentences, a large number of participants in the March "uprisings" were released.

An interesting incident of the period was the trial of persons implicated in the Kapp Putsch, which took place at Leipzig in December. Herr von Jagow was sentenced to five years' detention in a fortress, while the proceedings against other accused persons were suspended. Ludendorff testified during the trials, and the Socialist press demanded that charges be preferred against him also. Nothing came of this, however. In the meantime Kapp remained in Sweden, and other men who had been prominent in the revolt were ostensibly in hiding.

The treaty of peace between the United States and Germany was ratified in October and on November 11, Armistice Day, the

ratifications were formally ~~exchanged~~ in Berlin. Normal diplomatic relations were now resumed; the American Commissioner, Mr. Dressel, became Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy in Berlin and a similar official was sent to Washington to take up his duties in the German Embassy.

In December the Allied Military Control Commission announced that the dismantling of all unauthorized fortifications in unoccupied Germany had been practically completed and that plans had been made for the destruction of the remaining fortifications in the occupied territories.¹ At about the same time Chancellor Wirth claimed that all "self-defense" organizations had been disbanded.

A number of state and municipal elections took place during the period. The results in most cases showed appreciable gains by the parties of the Right.

The reparations question was the most important issue during the last three months of 1921. The Loucheur-Rathenau, or Wiesbaden, agreement for the partial payment of reparations by deliveries in kind was signed early in October. The total value of German deliveries to France up to May 1, 1926, was not to exceed seven billion gold marks. This amount was to be credited to the reparations account, but not more than one billion was to be credited in any one year. Supplementary agreements fixed the amounts of railway rolling stock, machinery and livestock which Germany was required to deliver to France, determined the prices for coal deliveries, and granted Germany the right to export coal if she fulfilled the reparations demands.

After the decision of the Council of the League of Nations
¹Volume II, Chapter 13.

with regard to the partition of Upper Silesia had been made public, German financiers predicted a financial collapse and claimed that the fulfillment of the reparations demands was now impossible. Bills providing for the new taxation program were introduced into the Reichstag, bringing forth a storm of criticism from the members. The Government declared its willingness to carry out all reparations agreements until the Allies recognized that Germany could not fulfill the entire demands. Industrial leaders offered to grant a loan to the Government provided the national railways were converted into private enterprises; this was strongly opposed by the Socialists and the railway employees. Up to the end of the year no particular progress in the taxation program or in the "credit action" of German industries had been made. Both Rathenau and Hugo Stinnes, the "wizard of German industry", endeavored to raise a loan in England, but failed to achieve success.

The Reparations Commission visited Berlin and announced a belief that Germany could meet the next reparations payments which were due in January and February 1922, and demanded that every effort to do so be made. Chancellor Wirth replied that as the German Government had not been able to raise the necessary loans either at home or abroad, he could not guarantee payment of the amounts due in January and February. He then stated that his Government was obliged to ask for a moratorium. The discussions with the Reparations commission were continued, and at the end of the year the issue remained unsettled.

A conference between Lloyd George and the French Premier Briand was held at London in December. It was decided to hold a meeting at Cannes in early January, for the particular purpose of

discussing the reparations question and methods of stabilizing the economic situation of Europe.

At its meeting in August the Supreme Council had provided for a commission of financial and military delegates to examine into the costs of occupation and such reductions as in their opinion might be effected. The Commission met in Paris during October. The American delegates were General Allen; his Finance Officer, Lieutenant Colonel E. A. Sturges; Mr. R. W. Boyden, United States Unofficial Representative with the Reparations Commission; and Colonel R. H. Hess, U. S. Army Reserve, American Finance Representative.

The question of limiting the total costs of occupation to 240 million gold marks per annum, in accordance with the agreement of June 16, 1919, was discussed. The American delegation stated that it was without authority to agree to any limitation upon the costs of the American occupation short of the actual costs to the United States of its occupying forces; it believed that the costs of occupation should be reduced by reducing the number of troops in the Rhineland; and General Allen proposed to cooperate by reducing the number of American troops. The British delegation took the stand that the purpose of the meeting was to determine how the yearly sum of 240 million gold marks was to be divided among the Governments concerned, and if any Government exceeded the amount allotted it, the excess cost should be borne by that Government. The French delegation objected to any reduction of troops that would interfere with French policy in the Rhineland, and questioned the competency of the Commission to discuss the matter. General Weygand, Chief of Staff to Marshal Foch, stated

that he would have to withdraw from the meeting if a "reduction in effectives was discussed". The Belgian delegation supported the French stand, with the result that the discussions were confined to considering the costs of occupation without limitation.

An estimate of the costs of the American troops, based on 8500 effectives (after May 1, 1922) was approved by the Commission. This estimate fixed the direct American costs at \$14,492,000 direct costs and the indirect costs (supplies and services in kind) at approximately 57 billion paper marks. General Allen announced that he would make every effort to keep the American costs within the amounts stated in the estimate, and even to reduce the costs below these figures.¹ The total number of the troops of occupation had been fixed at 132,000. Immediately after General Allen proposed to reduce the American troops to 8,500, the other delegations announced their intention of increasing their forces by the number of American troops withdrawn and of estimating their costs on that basis. The British were opposed to this action, but stated that "in self-defense" they had to participate.

The action of the Interallied Military Control Commission in demanding the partial destruction of certain plants belonging to the Deutsche Werke, a great corporation whose factories had formerly produced munitions of war, caused heated protests in Germany. It developed into a political issue when the Reichstag passed a unanimous resolution of protest. The Government requested revocation or modification of the order and also protested.

¹For a statement of the costs of the American Occupation and German payments thereof, see Volume 1. Chapter 9.

against a demand that the manufacture of certain types of Diesel motors be prevented. Both matters were discussed by the Conference of Ambassadors, but no definite decision was arrived at.

One of the outstanding features of the economic situation was the depreciation, accompanied by violent fluctuations, of the mark. On October 1 the American dollar would buy 122 marks, and on October 17 it was worth 191 marks. Four days later the dollar was quoted at 161 marks, and on October 31 its value was 180 marks. Then came the great November depreciation and the violent fluctuations. The tabulation set forth below shows the course of the mark during the last two months of 1921 -- the figures being the exchange value of the dollar in German marks.

November 2	194
" 5	250
" 7	350
" 9	246
" 12	287
" 15	260
" 26	296
" 30	240
December 1	192
" 5	230
" 14	177
" 16	198
" 19	178
" 21	171
" 31	184

The great depreciation of the mark was said to have been due to the belief of foreign financial circles that Germany's bankruptcy was at hand. The partial recovery between November 7 and 9 was caused by strong rumors that a moratorium would be granted to Germany. The fluctuations in general were attributed to the alternating pessimistic and optimistic rumors with which the financial atmosphere was alive at that time. Business in

general was greatly stimulated and there was a boom on the stock exchanges in Germany. The fluctuations occasionally caused mild panics, however, and in the beginning of December a number of banks failed because of speculation, while "thousands of speculators were ruined". Gambling in foreign currency had become so widespread that the Reichstag passed a law to curb it.

There was another rush of foreign buyers to Germany and prices rose sharply. Every portion of Germany was affected by the influx of foreigners, and certain industries in neighboring countries were partially paralyzed by the sudden cessation of orders. The regulations against large sales to foreigners did not prove entirely effective but they served to stop the rush. In many parts of Germany anywhere from 25% to 100% extra was charged foreigners by retail merchants, restaurants and hotels; in the occupied territory this was not permitted in the case of members of the occupying forces and the High Commission for their families.

Prices rose rapidly as the mark depreciated in value, and in November there was a large increase in the number of wage disputes, strikes and lockouts. The labor unions were very active, but in general employers were disposed to grant reasonable increases of wages. The cost of living continued to increase and demands for higher wages kept pace with it throughout Germany. Wage disputes and strikes grew somewhat less in December but the rise in the exchange value of the mark did not result in a decrease of the cost of living. At the end of the year a general strike of postal employees was threatened, while a railroad strike had been called

on December 29.¹

Food conditions were comparatively good as regarded the amount available, but the prices had risen greatly. Due to the long period of low water in the rivers and the unusually cold weather, which had caused many canals to freeze, a coal shortage developed and became a serious economic problem. Railroads had to curtail their traffic and many industries were adversely affected. At the same time the number of unemployed was far less at the end of December than it had been at the beginning of the period.

The end of the year found the conditions of life, particularly of the salaried people and those with fixed incomes, considerably worse than they had been during the summer; for them, in fact, the conditions were more adverse than at almost any time since 1918. In this connection the index figures of the cost of living, in terms of the 1913 cost which is assumed to be 100, are of interest:

January 1920	854
January 1921	944
September 1921	1062
December 1921	1550

A glance at the financial situation at the end of 1921 will be of interest. During December the expenditures of the German Government had exceeded the receipts by over 19 billion paper marks. The floating debt was almost 247 billion paper marks and the number of Reichsbank notes in circulation amounted to 117 billion paper marks. At the beginning of the year the floating debt had been 153 billion paper marks and the Reichsbank notes in circulation 80.8 billion paper marks.

The end of 1921 found Germany faced with many difficult problems

¹ Volume I (Chapter 2) and Volume II (Chapter 14).

and possessed of grave apprehensions as to her future. But her people were hard at work, "the chimneys were smoking" throughout the country, and by comparison with other nations unemployment had ceased to be a problem.

The population of the occupied territories retained a keen interest in the various questions of the time and the conditions of life continued to be generally the same as in unoccupied Germany. As usual, however, the occupied territories, and more particularly the American area, experienced many less strikes. Wage disputes were constant, but most of them were settled without the occurrence of strikes, and the only serious one was the railroad strike called on December 29, and this was settled in short order.

Great satisfaction was expressed over the abolition of the economic sanctions, and much dissatisfaction was voiced when it was reported that France had decided to maintain the military sanctions. As the industries in the American area were already working nearly to capacity, the effect of the removal of the customs barrier was not very great, and it was thus shown that the economic sanctions ~~had not been nearly so~~ harmful as was claimed. At the same time it should be remembered that as licenses were still required for the passage of goods, trade continued to be hampered.

With the exception of the separatists, the politicians in the Rhineland were not very active during the period. The Dorten group met at Cologne in November, but the attendance was very small and Dorten indicated his belief that the movement had failed.

The Smeets group now became more active. (Their organ, the "Rheinische Republik", published in Cologne, had been suspended for two weeks by the German police, acting under the general authority of

the Presidential decree issued in August). Early in December they held a meeting at Bonn (French area). The meeting was orderly, but several days afterward Smeets was arrested by the German police. The High Commission ordered him to be released pending investigation.¹ This action caused great indignation, and all political parties except the Independent Socialists and the Communists denounced Smeets and affirmed their loyalty to Prussia and the nation. In the middle of December all parties except the two mentioned above met at Koenigs-winter in the neutral zone. A resolution was passed denouncing all separatist propaganda and emphasizing the loyalty of the Rhine-landers to the German nation. The formation of a Rhenish state within Germany should take place only in accordance with the German Constitution, and it was insisted that no vote on this subject should be taken during the period of the occupation. While the Independent Socialists did not participate in the meeting, they issued a notice declaring themselves to hold the same views. Other meetings held in the occupied territories showed clearly that the separatist movement was opposed by all but a small minority of the German population. Smeets claimed to be optimistic, but it was apparent that there was no chance of separatism succeeding unless it was forcibly imposed on the Rhineland.

Early in October a number of German ex-officers who were holding a meeting in Crefeld (Belgian area) were arrested by the Belgian military authorities. Sixteen of the thirty-two placed on trial were found guilty of having made speeches prejudicial to the safety of the troops of occupation, or of having weapons in their possession, or of having entered the occupied territories without proper passports.

¹ Volume I, Chapter 2.

The sentences imposed ranged from one to six months' imprisonment and from 1000 to 10,000 marks fine. The arrests and convictions resulted in the expression of much indignation in the German press.

The coming into force of the treaty of peace between the United States and Germany raised an interesting question as to the status of the American troops and of the American zone. Both had been governed by the Armistice Agreement except in so far as General Allen had permitted the Ordinances of the High Commission to apply in the American Area. Early in November he submitted the following to the State Department:

Shall the American Forces in Germany continue to be governed by the powers granted the Commanding General in the Armistice Agreement, as at present?

or

Shall these forces be governed as provided in the Rhineland Agreement, annexed to the Treaty of Versailles, contemplated by Article 1 of the new Treaty?

As a decision was not received up to the end of the year, General Allen pursued the same policies as before, and the ratification of the Treaty of Berlin caused no change in the conduct of the affairs in the American area.

A reduction of the American troops having been ordered by the War Department, some 3600 troops left for the United States during the period and one brigade was disbanded on December 31, 1921.

The reduction in strength caused a recurrence of rumors that all American troops were to be withdrawn at an early date. The German population of the area were quick to express their desire

that some American troops remain until the end of the occupation, and the German press contained articles along similar lines. The German Government made no official statement, but high officials asked that Washington be unofficially informed that Germany hoped that the United States would not give up the American area. The High Commissioners and the Allied military commanders in the Rhineland also expressed their desire that the United States continue to be represented in the occupation. Frequent press dispatches from the United States announced the early withdrawal of the American troops, but no indication of its intentions in the matter came from the United States Government.

A composite battalion of picked men was present at Paris in early October when General Pershing placed the Medal of Honor upon the tomb of the Unknown Soldier of France. The same battalion was sent to London to participate in the ceremonies incident to the decoration of the British Unknown Warrior by General Pershing. In the middle of the month General Allen, accompanied by a detachment of non-commissioned officers, proceeded to Chalons-sur-Marne; representing the United States he there received the American Unknown Soldier and escorted the remains to Le Havre where he handed them over to the Navy. The Unknown Soldier was placed on board the U.S.S. "Olympia" and transported to Washington for burial in the National Cemetery at Arlington.

November 11, Armistice Day, was celebrated in the American area with appropriate ceremonies.

A rather severe epidemic of influenza and pneumonia occurred in the American area in December. Both the troops and the civil population were affected and there were a number of deaths.¹

¹ Volume II, Chapters 5 and 26.

Christmas was again characterized by gifts to poor German children. A different system was employed: Each organization assembled the poor children in its immediate vicinity, furnished a Christmas tree and amusements, and distributed presents to the little guests. As before, these kindly actions evoked appreciative comments from the German people and press.

General Allen was present at the decoration of the French Unknown Soldier, but was unable to participate in the ceremonies in London because of his attendance at the meeting in Paris to discuss the costs of occupation. In early November he went again to Paris to attend a similar meeting, and late in the month he visited London for a conference with the American Ambassador.

Among the prominent visitors to Coblenz during the period were Marshal Petain and General Degoutte of the French Army and Major General H.L. Rogers, Quartermaster General of the United States Army.

CHAPTER NO. 2.

The Interallied Rhineland High Commission.

Organization; Powers and Duties;
Initial Legislation; In the American Area;
Liaison with German Authorities; Activities;
Appendices.

Reference

General ----- -A.M.S. Volumes I and IV.

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THE INTER-ALLIED RHINELAND HIGH COMMISSION.ORGANIZATION.

The Rhineland Agreement, which formed an annex to the Treaty of Versailles and was signed with it on June 28, 1919, provided for the establishment of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission¹. The inception of the idea of such a commission

¹ A.M.G., Volume IV, Page 1381.

and the discussions that resulted in the Rhineland Agreement are shown in previous volumes of this work.²

Article 2 of the Rhineland Agreement provided that -

There shall be constituted a civilian body styled the Interallied Rhineland High Commission and hereinafter called the High Commission, which, except insofar as the Treaty may otherwise provide, shall be the supreme representative of the Allied and Associated Powers within the Occupied Territory. It shall consist of four members, representing Belgium, France, Great Britain and the United States.

Since May 1919 the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission³ had been the agent of the Supreme Economic Council in the Occupied territories. Between the signing of the Treaty and its ratification in January 1920, this Commission had been largely engaged in making preparations for the coming into power of its successor, the High Commission.¹ The initial organization of the High Commission was essentially the same as that of its predecessor.

The High Commission consisted of four High Commissioners, appointed respectively by the Governments of the United States, Belgium, Great Britain and France, the appointment of each being made with the approval of the other Governments. The French High Commissioner was President. Each High Commissioner was assisted by a Deputy High Commissioner and by technical advisers selected by the former. Two Secretaries-General, one English speaking and the other French speaking, were appointed by the High Commission and were to be present at all its meetings. The seat of the High

² A.M.G., Volume I, (Page 450,) and Volume IV, (Page 1378.)

³ A.M.G., Volume I, Chapter 18, Page 457.

¹ The ordinances and instructions published on January 10, 1920, by the High Commission had been prepared by the Rhineland Commission in conjunction with the military authorities.

Commission was at Coblenz where one or more meetings were held each week.

Each High Commissioner was present, in person or by representative, at all meetings. Decisions were adopted by majority vote, each High Commissioner having one vote. In case of a tie, the President could give a casting vote. Should a High Commissioner be dissatisfied with a decision he might appeal to his Government, but in urgent cases such an appeal would not operate to delay the execution of the decision, which was carried out upon the responsibility of those who voted for it. The results of the meetings were recorded in minutes which were communicated to those concerned.

Usually questions which came before the High Commission had been studied in advance by one or more of the permanent Committees, the members of which were selected from among the technical advisers of the High Commissioners. Each committee was composed of four members, one from the department of each High Commissioner. The committee system facilitated the work of the High Commission, as in the majority of cases the opinion of a committee was adopted by the High Commissioners with but little discussion. The permanent committees were -

- Administrative
- Coal
- Communications
- Economic
- Financial
- Intelligence
- Legal
- Requisitions.

Further details regarding the organization and procedure of the High Commission will be found in Appendices 1 and 2 to this chapter.

The High Commissioners.

As originally constituted the High Commission consisted of the following High Commissioners and Deputy High Commissioners:

Belgium: Baron Rolin-Jaequemyns
M. Fernand Cattoir

France: M. Paul Tirard
M. Amedee Roussellier

Great Britain: Sir Harold Stuart
Mr. Malcolm Arnold Robertson.

The American Representative.

Before the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles on January 10, 1920, the representative of the United States (Mr. Pierrepont B. Hays) took an active part in the preparations for the establishment of the High Commission and in the drafting of the initial ordinances and instructions. At that time his powers and status were the same as those of the other officials who were soon to be named High Commissioners. But the failure of the United States to ratify the Treaty caused a change in his status after January 10. He could not be designated as High Commissioner and therefore could not be an official member of the High Commission. It appeared that until the United States were officially represented on the High Commission, the latter could not be a legally constituted body.¹ The legal question was ignored, and the problem as to the participation of the American representative

¹The German Government might well have raised this point; that it refrained from doing so was probably because of a belief that an expression of opinion by the American representative would have the same weight as the votes of the High Commissioners, and possibly because of a desire that the military government of the occupied territories should come to an end as quickly as possible.

was solved by an agreement that Mr Noyes, with the approval of the State Department, should continue to represent the United States, but that his presence at the meetings of the High Commission should be unofficial and he should have no vote. His technical status having been settled, the American Representative (as he came to be designated) proceeded to organize his department, the functions of which became similar to those of the other departments. He attended all meetings of the High Commission and, while technically he did not vote, his opinions had practically as much influence as if they had been votes.

In order to keep in close touch with the activities of the High Commission, the American Commanding General assigned an officer of his staff (Colonel D. L. Stone, G. S. as liaison officer and military adviser to the American Representative.

The German Commissioner.

While the Rhineland Agreement was still in embryo, the German Government requested permission to appoint a German official to co-operate with the High Commission and to constitute the channel through which the population of the occupied territories might address the High Commission. This German official would be the supreme representative of the German Republic and of the federated states concerned (Prussia, Bavaria, Hesse, Baden and Birkenfeld), and would alone be authorized to negotiate with the High Commission. This request was repeated in a note date July 11, 1919,² and with certain reservations was granted by the Allied and

² A.M.G. Volume IV, Appendix No. 51 (Document III, Page 124)

Associated Powers on July 29, 1919.¹ The German Government was given to understand that the appointment of such an official was not provided for in the text of the Rhineland Agreement; that the individual chosen for the position must previously be approved by the Allied and Associated Governments, who might recall their approval at any time; and that his competence could extend only to those matters which, in accordance with the provisions of the German Constitution, came under the authority of the central German Government. The right of the High Commission to enter into relations with any local German authority whatsoever regarding matters within the latter's competence, was also reserved.²

The German official was designated the Reichskommissar, and became generally known as the German Commissioner.

The German Peace Delegation, in view of the fact that the occupied portion of Germany was governed by the laws of the National Government and of five federated states as well,³ requested that before publishing its ordinances the High Commission consult the German Commissioner and secure his opinions thereon. The Allies agreed that such a procedure might be useful, but stipulated that there would be no obligation upon the High Commission to follow it.⁴ During 1920 and 1921 the High Commission several times consulted the German Commissioner before publishing ordinances, but it was by no means a general rule. In fact, during 1921 his opinion was seldom ascertained before the publication of an ordinance and then only because of his protest.

¹A.M.G., Volume IV, Appendix No. 51 (Document III, Page 135)

²Ibid - Page 136.

³Ibid - Page 125.

⁴Ibid - Page 136.

Herr von Starck was the first German Commissioner, serving as such until the summer of 1921.

POWERS AND DUTIES.

Upon the declaration of a state of peace between the Allied countries and Germany, the High Commission became the supreme representative of the Allies in occupied Germany. Its authority extended throughout the occupied territories, which included the four bridgeheads (Cologne, Coblenz, Mainz and Kehl) as well as all German territory on the left (west) bank of the Rhine. Technically it had no power in the American area, but practically it had, by virtue of a modus vivendi which had been agreed upon by the American Commanding General and the High Commission.¹

The High Commission was created to secure the maintenance, safety and requirements of the forces of occupation, and it was given the power to issue such ordinances as might be necessary to fulfill its mission. But the civil administration was to remain in the hands of the German authorities and under the authority of the central German Government, except in so far as it might be necessary for the High Commission to adapt that administration to the needs and circumstances of military occupation.

The power to declare a state of siege (martial law) in the occupied territories or any part thereof was given to the High Commission. Upon such declaration the military authorities would assume control, but they were to act in combination with the High

¹For a description of the way in which the difficult situation with regard to the American area was met, see A.M.G, Volumes I (Chapter 18) and IV (Page 1376 et seq.)

Commission and with its approval in the issue of decrees and proclamations or in the matter of intervention in the civil administration.

The Rhineland Agreement provided that the ordinances of the High Commission should have the force of law; these ordinances related to criminal and civil jurisdiction and pertaining matters and to administrative matters affecting the forces of occupation. The power of adapting the civil administration to the needs and circumstances of military occupation was exercised by the suspension or modification of such German laws as might prejudice the maintenance, safety or requirements of the forces of occupation. This power extended to all German laws published after the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles; before these could become effective in the occupied territories, they had to be submitted to the High Commission for examination and decision as to their admissibility.

Under the system provided for in the Rhineland Agreement three varieties of laws were effective in the occupied territories-

Ordinances of the High Commission, most of which applied to the occupying forces as well as to the civil population.

German laws, which applied to foreigners who were not attached to the armies or the High Commission, as well as to Germans.

Laws of the countries participating in the occupation, which governed their respective nationals officially present in the Rhineland.

The ordinances were transmitted to the military authorities through the Headquarters of the Allied Armies of Occupation and to those German authorities who were charged with their enforcement. In so far as Germans were concerned, the ordinances were considered as an integral part of German law applying to the

occupied territories. German courts, in applying or interpreting German law, had to take the ordinances into consideration. As a matter of fact, the ordinances took precedence over German laws, as all provisions of the latter that conflicted with the ordinances were automatically suspended.

INITIAL LEGISLATION.

On January 10, 1920, the High Commission published the following ordinances and instructions:¹

Ordinance No. 1 - Legislative power of the High Commission, orders of the military authorities and operation of German laws and regulations in the Occupied Territories.

Ordinance No. 2 - Criminal and civil jurisdiction and offences relating to the occupation.

Ordinance No. 3 - Movement of persons; postal telegraphic and telephonic communication; restrictions imposed on the press and public meetings; possession of and trade in arms and ammunition.

Ordinance No. 4 - Extension of the ordinances of the High Commission to the Kehl Bridgehead.

Ordinance No. 5 - Procedure to be followed in the settlement of industrial disputes.

Ordinance No. 6 - Powers and duties of the Inter-allied Rhineland Railway Commission.

Instruction No. 1 - Use of the Allied forces in Occupied Territories for maintenance of public order.

Instruction No. 2 - Duties of German authorities in matters of security and police.

Instruction No. 3 - Notification of appointment of German officials.

Instruction No. 4 - Notification of disease.

Instruction No. 5 - Exemption from the jurisdiction of courts.

Instruction No. 6 - Supervision and inspection of prisons.

Instruction No. 7 - Permits to carry arms and ammunition.

In large part this legislation was the result of the experience

¹Ordinances and Instruction will be found in Appendix 2 to this Chapter.

gained by the forces of occupation during the Armistice, and in modified form it embodied many orders issued by the military authorities. It was felt that as peace had been declared, many of the restrictions that had obtained since the beginning of the occupation should be removed. But the provisions of the ordinances concerning the movement of individuals, telephone and telegraph communication, the settlement of industrial disputes, duties of German officials, inspection of prisons, and the issue of permits to carry arms and ammunition - all these were in keeping with the policies followed by the armies during the period of the Armistice. It was the endeavor of the High Commission, however, in so far as was compatible with the interests of the occupation, to restore its former liberty to the population and to charge the German authorities with the responsibility for the maintenance of order and the operation of public utilities. Some of the more liberal provisions of the ordinances are set forth below.

 Germans traveling from one portion of the occupied territories to another or entering or leaving unoccupied Germany, required no special authority, the only requirement being that every individual above the age of 14 should have an identity card.

 Newspapers and books could be published freely and without censorship before publication. The High Commission reserved the right to forbid or suspend the publication or sale of any periodical or book of a nature prejudicial to public order or to the security or dignity of the High Commission or the forces of occupation.

There was no restriction upon public meetings other than that 48 hours notice of all political meetings had to be given. Any meeting that might endanger public order could be forbidden or dissolved.

In principle there was to be no censorship of the mail, telephone or telegraph, but the High Commission from time to time caused the correspondence of certain suspicious persons to be censored.

Non-interference with the German administration was the policy of the High Commission. However, should a German official disobey its ordinances or the orders of the military authorities, he was removed from office and sometimes expelled from the occupied territories. And if an official appointed by the German authorities proved to be undesirable, his appointment was rescinded at the demand of the High Commission.

As regarded German criminal jurisdiction, the personnel of the forces of occupation and of the High Commission were not subject to it. The military personnel could be punished only by military tribunals, while members and employees of the High Commission could not be tried by any court in the Rhineland without the consent of the High Commission.

In civil suits, members of the military forces or personnel of the High Commission, in their private capacity, might be cited to appear before German courts, but if the findings of the court were considered unjust, such persons could appeal to the High Commission.

IN THE AMERICAN AREA.

The failure of the United States to ratify the Treaty of Versailles caused a difficult situation to arise in the American area after January 10, 1920.¹ The problem was simplified by the decision of the American Commanding General to make the ordinances effective in the American area by their publication in orders by his Headquarters. By making a few minor reservations, he enhanced the prestige and authority of the High Commission without relinquishing any of the powers inherent in him under the Armistice Agreement and the laws of war. With a few exceptions, all American military orders that conflicted with the ordinances were revoked by Civil Affairs Bulletin No. 58, issued on January 31, 1920.² The reservations and supplementary provisions made by the American Headquarters are briefly described below.

Article 16 of Ordinance No. 3 required that notice of political meetings must be given 48 hours in advance of the meeting. Experience had demonstrated that industrial (labor union) meetings had been more prolific of trouble than had political meetings; hence in the American zone a 48 hours advance notice of both political and industrial meetings continued to be required.

Article 8 of Ordinance No. 3 provided that -

Any person who wishes to take up his residence in the Occupied Territories shall make application in writing to the German authorities of the locality in which he wishes to reside. Such authorities may give the required permission and shall, within three days, communicate the decision reached to the representative of the High Commission in the Kreis concerned.

¹ A.M.G., Volume IV, Page 1376.

² Volume I, Chapter 3 (Appendix No. 1.)

Coblenz, the seat of the High Commission as well as of the American Headquarters, was very much congested. Therefore the American military authorities continued to require that those who desired to remain in Coblenz for more than 20 days would have to secure the consent of the American Headquarters (through the German authorities).

A technical state of war continued to exist between the United States and Germany. Hence, until the two countries should be at peace, the German courts would not be permitted to exercise civil jurisdiction over members of the American forces (as was provided by Article 15 of Ordinance No. 2).

As the Ordinances contained no provision regarding such matters, the American authorities reiterated that German physicians were prohibited from treating or giving medical advice to members of the American forces suffering from venereal disease.

Article 29 of Ordinance No. 2 forbade persons trading with the public to sell to any member of the forces of occupation, or to any Allied official, any article at a higher price than that usually paid by the German public. With a view to the enforcement of this provision, the American military authorities required price lists to be posted in restaurants and cafes and articles for sale in shops to be marked with their respective prices.

Subject to the above changes and supplementary provisions, the initial ordinances were permitted to be effective in the American area as well as in the remainder of the occupied territories. With very few exceptions all ordinances and instructions issued by the High Commission between January 10, 1920 and the end of 1921

were permitted to apply in the American zone. Article 2 of Ordinance 49 provides that -

The High Commission alone shall have the right to decide the suitability of the premises intended for the residence of its members, officials and employees, with respect to their rank and office and of their functions or duties.

The American Commander could not admit that in the matter of billets in the American area the High Commission could have right superior to his own; in addition, the congested conditions in Coblenz required special regulations. It was agreed, therefore, that the article cited should not be effective in the Landkreis or Stadtkreis Coblenz.

LIAISON WITH GERMAN AUTHORITIES.

The German note of July 12, 1919, regarding the interpretation of the Rhineland Agreement, assumed that after the ratification of the Treaty, administrative or supervisory officials would no longer be attached to the German authorities as had been the case during the Armistice.¹ This was admitted in the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers, which stated that the High Commission would maintain fixed representatives charged with the duty of securing liaison between the local German authorities, the local military authorities and the High Commission itself.² Accordingly, the High Commission appointed a representative in each Kreis or corresponding administrative district in the occupied territories. The Kreis representatives were to act as liaison officers between the military authorities and the local German

¹ A.M.G., Volume IV, Appendix No. 51, (Document III, Page 131)

² Ibid - Page 142.

authorities. In addition, it was their duty to transmit the orders of the High Commission. While in no way was it intended that they should supervise the local German administrations, many attempts to extend their authority were made. The duties of the Kreis representatives were clearly defined in the ordinances and instructions of the High Commission.³

ACTIVITIES.

During the early months of 1920 the High Commission was engaged in solving numerous administrative problems which had arisen as a result of its having taken over many of the functions formerly exercised by the military authorities. The critical political situation in unoccupied Germany and the accompanying events caused the High Commission to take action in several instances.

The Kapp Putsch.¹

The coup d'etat, generally known as the Kapp Putsch, occurred in Berlin in the middle of March 1920 and was followed by widespread disorder in unoccupied Germany. The great industrial region in the valley of the Ruhr River was one of the centers of disorder. As the Ruhr District adjoined the British and Belgian zones of occupation, it was feared that the disorder might spread to the occupied territories. As a measure of prevention the High Commission adopted Ordinance No. 12, which empowered its local representatives to prohibit all meetings or gatherings of a nature that might endanger the security of the forces of occupation, and to direct the population to keep off the streets at night. This

³And see Appendix 3 to this Chapter.

¹Volume I, Chapter I.

ordinance was applied for short periods of time in several districts in both the British and Belgian areas.

On March 26 the High Commission adopted Ordinance No. 16, permitting censorship over the mail, telephone and telegraph to be imposed for a period of one month. A censorship was immediately imposed in the Belgian area where radical agitation was being conducted.

While maintaining a neutral attitude toward the dissensions in unoccupied Germany, the forces of occupation would permit no disorder or provocative demonstrations in the occupied territories. As a result of this stand and of the preventive measures of the High Commission, there was no disturbance of any consequence in the Rhineland during the eventful spring of 1920.

The Ruhr Revolt.¹

The collapse of the Kapp government was followed by a serious uprising in the Ruhr District, which was generally termed the Ruhr Revolt. Much hard fighting ensued, and the struggles between the revolting workmen and the troops of the Reichswehr² involved developments in the occupied territories that called for the intervention of the authorities of occupation.

On March 19, after a combat with the "Red Troops", some 1500 men of the Reichswehr sought refuge in the British area. These troops were disarmed and interned by the British. After negotiations

¹ Volume I, Chapter I.

² Literally, the National Defense Organization - the newly adopted designation of the combined German Army and Navy. Later the German Army was designated as the Reichsheer, or National Army.

covering several weeks, and with the consent of the Allied military authorities, these troops were permitted to return to unoccupied Germany.

Another problem arose when, on April 6, several thousand Red troops took refuge in the British zone after having been defeated and pursued by the Reichswehr: they declared their belief that the Reichswehr would execute them without trial if they remained in the Ruhr District. The fugitives were disarmed and interned. The guarding and feeding of so many persons for a prolonged period was impracticable; hence the High Commission proposed to the Allied Governments that they negotiate with the German Government for the return, under suitable guarantees, to unoccupied Germany of the interned fugitives. An amnesty having been proclaimed by the German Government, practically all of the Reds had been returned to unoccupied Germany by April 21.

After this there were no further difficulties in the British or Belgian zones. The American zone remained unaffected during the entire period, except that the floating population was increased by the arrival of a number of undesirables who were promptly deported.

The Occupation of Frankfurt and Darmstadt.¹

During the operations which resulted in the quelling of the Ruhr Revolt, the German Government sent more troops into the neutral zone than were authorized under the existing agreements governing the number of effectives therein. The Germans claimed

¹Volume I, Chapter 1.

that the number of troops used were the minimum necessary to the restoration of order in the Ruhr District. Their contention was not admitted, and, after much discussion pro and con, the French Government directed that the cities of Frankfurt on the Main and Darmstadt be occupied by the French Army of the Rhine. Upon the receipt of the instructions from his Government, the French Commanding General requested the High Commission to declare a state of siege in the bridgehead of Mainz. He claimed that such action was necessary in order to ensure the security of his troops and their communications. The High Commission complied with the request and a state of siege, limited to the Mainz bridgehead, was proclaimed on April 6 - the first instance of the kind that had occurred since the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles.

The High Commission requested that it be informed as to the non-military measures which had been put into effect in the Mainz area as a consequence of the state of siege. The French Commander replied that the state of siege was of a restricted nature and that the non-military orders issued by him prescribed only such measures as were indispensable to the security of his troops. They included the supervision of German officials and public utilities by the military authorities, the prohibition of strikes and of unauthorized meetings and demonstrations, the establishment of military courts for the trial of civilians, and the suspension of newspapers for a few days. Later the restrictions were made less severe, and on May 2, upon the recommendation of the French Commander, the state of siege was ended by the High Commission.

With the ending of the state of siege in the Mainz area, the last difficulties which had arisen from the upheaval caused

by the Kapp Putsch were settled in so far as the High Commission was concerned.

The Relief of Mr. Noyes.

In May 1920, Mr. Pierrepont B. Noyes, the American Representative, was informed by the State Department that as the Treaty of Versailles had not been ratified by the United States, it was considered advisable that the American Civilian representative be withdrawn. At the close of the meeting of the High Commission on June 2, Mr. Noyes informed the High Commission of his imminent departure for the United States and of his regrets upon ending his pleasant association with them. The President, speaking for the High Commission, stated that Mr. Noyes had furnished the inspiration for the Rhineland Agreement and that he had taken a preponderant part in the work which had culminated in the establishment of the High Commission. The President laid stress upon the disinterestedness, good faith and devotion displayed by Mr. Noyes and expressed the keen regret held by the High Commission upon his departure.

Appointment of General Allen.

Major General Henry T. Allen, the Commander of the American Forces in Germany, was informed on May 21 that, at the request of the State Department, the Secretary of War had agreed that upon the relief of Mr. Noyes, General Allen could replace him. This responsibility was to be in addition to his duties as Commanding General. Accordingly, upon the departure of Mr. Noyes, General Allen became the American Representative with the High Commission.

Realizing that his military duties would render it impossible for him to devote as much time to High Commission matters as could the High Commissioners, General Allen, in order to keep in daily touch with the High Commission, appointed Colonel David L. Stone, G.S., as his delegate. The latter's position was practically that of a Deputy High Commissioner; he attended all meetings and represented the United States in the settling of all but the more important questions.

General Allen kept his functions as American Representative entirely separate from those as Commanding General, and in his relations with the High Commission he acted, in so far as was practicable, as if he had been actually a civilian representative of the United States. Similarly, although he was a member of General Allen's Military Staff, Colonel Stone conducted himself in his work with the High Commission as a civilian rather than as a military official.

The Arrest of Dr. Dorten.

Dr. Dorten had been the leading German figure in the separatist movement in the Rhineland, and in May 1919, with the support of the French military authorities, had attempted to proclaim a Rhenish Republic, with himself as President. His attempt, such as it was, came to grief because of the refusal of General Liggett, Commanding the Third American Army to permit any interference with the Constituted German authorities except through due process of German law. In June Dorten made an unsuccessful attempt to oust the German authorities at Wiesbaden. Separatist agitation continued thereafter, but the vast majority of Rhinelanders were strongly

opposed to it, and the movement failed to gain headway.¹

Dr. Dorten maintained his residence in Wiesbaden (French area) and there, on July 24, 1920, he was arrested and removed to unoccupied Germany by armed police from Frankfurt.¹ In response to an inquiry, the Wiesbaden police authorities informed the High Commission that Dorten had been arrested in accordance with an order issued by the Frankfurt Chief of Police. The latter based his authority for the arrest upon a warrant, issued on June 11, 1919, which accused Dr. Dorten of high treason within the meaning of Articles 81 and 82 of the German penal code.²

During the peace negotiations, the Allied and Associated Powers had decided to protect those persons in the occupied territories who, during the Armistice period might have violated German political, financial or commercial laws, without having acted in such a way as to require prosecution by the authorities of occupation. The German Delegation protested, proposing to substitute an amnesty which would include the individuals convicted by Allied or Associated military courts as well as those who had violated German laws. The proposal was rejected, and in accordance with the decision mentioned, Article 31 of Ordinance No. 2 was adopted -

Without the consent of the High Commission, no judicial proceedings shall be instituted or continued and no punitive measures shall be taken against any person in the Occupied Territories for any administrative or political act done during the period of the Armistice.

¹A.M.G, Volume I, Chapter 15, Page 377.

¹The French had withdrawn from Frankfurt on May 17.

²Upon several occasions during the Armistice period, the German authorities had endeavored to arrest Dr. Dorten, but had been prevented by the military authorities of occupation who acted under the powers conferred upon them by the Armistice Agreement.

Dr. Dorten had been arrested on a warrant issued during the Armistice and because of political acts committed during that period. Therefore the High Commission considered that the action of the German police constituted an offense against its authority and that of the French military authorities; as the arrest had not been made with the consent of the High Commission, it was a violation of Article 31 of Ordinance No. 2 and of Ordinance No. 27 as well. The offense was an aggravated one in that it had been committed by German police from unoccupied Germany and that Dr. Dorten had been removed from the occupied territories.

While the French High Commissioner was the only one who displayed interest in Dr. Dorten and his political aspirations, the other members of the High Commission felt that they could not permit the German authorities to violate its ordinances with impunity. A demand for the immediate return of Dr. Dorten to Wiesbaden, in order that he might have opportunity to present his defense as provided by Ordinance No. 27, was made upon the German Commissioner. At the same time the High Commission informed the German Commissioner that pending the results of an investigation as to the implication of the Regierungspraesident and Chief of Police of Wiesbaden, both officials were suspended from office until further notice. The High Commission also informed the Commanding General of the French Army of the Rhine that it had no objection to the opening of a legal investigation of all persons suspected of complicity, especially the Regierungspraesident and Chief of Police of Wiesbaden.

The investigation made by the French military authorities disclosed the fact that the arrest of Dr. Dorten had been ordered by the Regierungspraesident of Cassel, in unoccupied Germany, and had been made under the direct instructions of the Chief of Police of Frankfurt. Several days before the arrest there had been two separate attempts to arrest Dorten; the Frankfurt police were in Wiesbaden when those attempts were made; Dorten had been shadowed

by means of information furnished by the police of Wiesbaden, who had communicated his movements by telephone; these facts were sufficient, in the opinion of the High Commission, to implicate the Regierungspräsident and Chief of Police of Wiesbaden and to justify its action in suspending them from office.

The German Government immediately released Dr. Dorten, admitted that the execution of the order for his arrest had constituted a violation of the ordinances of the High Commission, and expressed its regrets therefor. It was further stated that the Prussian Government had instituted an inquiry into the circumstances of the arrest, and assurances were given that those found culpable would be punished.

On September 23, the German Government submitted the report of its investigation. The Chief of the Intelligence Bureau for the Province of Hesse-Cassel, whose station was at Cassel, had been found to have been responsible for the arrest of Dr. Dorten. It was in consequence of information received by telephone from the Cassel Intelligence Bureau, that the Chief of Police at Frankfurt had come to the erroneous conclusion that the projected arrest of Dorten had been approved by the high administrative authorities. The Chief of the Intelligence Bureau at Cassel was removed from office, and the Chief of Police at Frankfurt was severely reprimanded.

Upon the receipt of the report of the German Government, the Dorten incident was considered to be closed. At a later date as it appeared that personally he had not been involved, the High Commission reinstated the Regierungspräsident of Wiesbaden.

Arrest of German War Criminals.

During the Armistice, and even after the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace, a number of Germans **charged with offenses** committed during the war had been arrested by the Belgian and French military authorities of occupation. Some of these had been tried by military courts in the occupied territories and sentenced to fines and imprisonment, while others had been taken into Belgium and France and there brought to trial. On January 24, 1920, the German Commissioner protested against this procedure and requested the High Commission to bring about the immediate release of the persons arrested. His contention was that in arresting persons charged with offenses committed during the war, the countries participating in the occupation were acting without legal authority; the arrest in German territory of German nationals for offenses committed abroad was a matter for the German authorities only, and where the arrest of an alleged "war criminal" was desired, formal application therefor should be made to the German authorities. He contended further that there was no authority for the removal of such persons from German territory for trial in a foreign country.

In reply to a number of similar protests, the High Commission, on March 25, 1920, informed the German Commissioner that the matter of arrests made during the period of the Armistice was not within its competence, and that the question of those made after the coming of peace would be referred to the governments concerned. The High Commission then gave instructions that no further arrests should be made, but as the military courts were disinclined to abandon their jurisdiction, many difficulties

attended the release of those already arrested.

Numerous requests for permission to arrest alleged offenders residing in the American area had been submitted to the American Headquarters by the Belgian and French authorities. These requests had always been denied, the Americans holding that as the Allies had agreed that, for the time being, alleged war criminals should be tried by the German courts at Leipzig, Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles no longer applied. On January 22, 1920, through an error of judgment on the part of a subordinate American officer, the American military police arrested a Dr. Hermann of Neuwied (American area) and delivered him to the Belgian military authorities. The arrest had been made at the request of the Belgians, who promptly removed the prisoner to Tourani. As soon as the error was discovered, the Americans requested the release of the prisoner. It developed that he had been tried "by default" before his arrest, and that he had already entered upon the service of his sentence of imprisonment; his delivery to the Belgians was then shown to have been doubly in error, as the American policy was against the arrest of persons sentenced "by default", whether or not they were war criminals.

Upon receipt of a protest from the German Commissioner the High Commission submitted the question of Dr. Hermann's arrest to the Belgian Government. The request for his release was repeated from time to time by the American Headquarters, but months passed before the matter was settled. Finally, on August 13, the High Commission was informed that the Belgian final court of appeal had set aside the verdict of the court of appeal at Brussels. The warrant of arrest was cancelled, and Dr. Hermann was released forthwith.

French Attitude towards Civilian Control.

The High Commission, in June 1920, authorized certain railway officials to carry arms. Somewhat later, General Payot, the Director General of the Communications and Supply of the Allied Armies, suspended this order. Through the Commanding General of the Allied Armies of Occupation, the High Commission informed General Payot that the cancellation or suspension of an order of the High Commission was not within his power.

This incident was indicative of the attitude of the French, civilian as well as military, towards civilian control of the occupied territories. Upon several occasions the French military authorities encroached upon matters within the jurisdiction of the High Commission; having placed a fait accompli before the High Commission, the French apparently expected it to approve the action taken. Such action was invariably defended by the French High Commissioner, which made it very difficult, and often impossible to have the High Commission take action in the way of a reprimand or caution to military commanders who had exceeded their authority.

There were very few instances of this kind in the Belgian area; whenever the Belgian military authorities displayed a tendency to exceed their authority, the Belgian High Commissioner was the first to call their attention to the limitations upon their powers. Neither the British nor the American military authorities ever came into conflict with the High Commission because of having acted in excess of their authority.

Relief of Sir Harold Stuart.

Sir Harold Stuart, the British High Commissioner tendered his resignation in October 1920. He had taken an important part in the organization of the High Commission and in the drafting of its ordinances, and he was as noted for his frankness and impartiality as he was for his intellectual powers and wide administrative experience. His departure involved a great loss to the High Commission and gave rise to expressions of regret from all sides. It had developed that, without pre-arrangement of any kind, his views and those of the American Representative had coincided upon almost every question of policy that had come before the High Commission.

Mr. Malcolm Arnold Robertson, the Deputy High Commissioner was then appointed British High Commissioner, being succeeded in the former position by Lieutenant Colonel Rupert S. Ryan.

French Time in the Rhineland.

Ordinarily there is a difference of one hour between French (Western European) time and the Central European time used in Germany. The adoption of summer time in France thus caused the same time to be used in both countries between March and October. In September 1920 the Headquarters of the Allied Armies of Occupation requested the High Commission to direct that Western European time be used in the Rhineland during the winter of 1920-21.¹

¹During the winter of 1919-20, Western European time was used on the railroads in the occupied territories and, except in the British area, as civil time also. Watches were advanced an hour as soon as trains entered unoccupied Germany, and, when it was ten o'clock in the British area it was nine o'clock in other parts of the Rhineland. The following winter civil time and German time were the same throughout the occupied territories.

This was objected to by the American and British forces who took the stand that it might prove disadvantageous to the industrial welfare of the occupied territories because and an additional hour of darkness during the working day would be entailed, and that in view of the shortage of coal, a change of time was highly undesirable. The American Representative pointed out that the request for a change of time was based upon the probable confusion that would arise in the event of mobilization, with Western European time used in France and Belgium while Central European time prevailed in the Rhineland; this confusion could be avoided by the issue of a military order providing that in mobilization orders the times prescribed should read one hour earlier in the occupied territories, and the economic and industrial life of occupied Germany should not be injuriously affected because of the remote contingency of mobilization. The request was then modified so as to affect railroad time only. To this the American, British and Belgian Commanders objected, stating that civil time and railroad time should be the same. Mr. Robertson, the British High Commissioner, stated at first that under no circumstances would he agree to a change of time; he was then informed by the French High Commissioner that the Allied Military Committee at Versailles considered it necessary that the railroad time should coincide with French time, whereupon he promptly withdrew his objections. The matter was compromised by changing the railroad time only, and during the winters of 1920-21 and 1921-22 when it was ten o'clock by "town time" in the Rhineland, it was nine o'clock railroad time.

Policy Relative to Industrial Disputes.¹

In November 1920 Ordinance No. 53, replacing Ordinances Nos. 5 and 14, was adopted, thus modifying the policy relative to industrial disputes. With a view to the prevention of strikes boards of conciliation were to be constituted. These boards proved to be almost uniformly successful. They were appointed only in cases of disputes involving industries wherein interruptions of service would affect the forces of occupation. The efforts of one board prevented a potentially serious strike in the brown coal industry in the British zone; another settled a dispute, involving 20,000 workmen, in the coal mines near Aix-la-Chapelle; a street car strike in Coblenz was averted through the efforts of a third board. The acceptance of the findings of these boards was not compulsory, but their intervention produced good effects as both sides had faith in the impartiality of the High Commission.

Issue of Numerous Ordinances.

The ordinances and instructions published by the High Commission on January 10, 1920, were considered to constitute the minimum amount of legislation necessary to ensure the safety, maintenance and requirements of the forces of occupation. It was realized that unforeseen developments would make necessary the modification of the original ordinances and the enacting of additional legislation. From the beginning, however, the American and British representatives wished to limit the number of

¹A.M.G., Volume I, (Chapter 10) and III, (Appendix No. 24, Page 893.)

ordinances issued by the High Commission. They deemed it wiser to solve problems, as they arose, by the application of existing ordinances, rather than to enact a mass of legislation with which the German population could not be expected to become familiar. The Belgian and French High Commissioners, influenced by their national systems, apparently desired to provide an ordinance for every situation that might arise; and as time passed their views prevailed in increasing extent. In 1920, the number of ordinances and instructions increased, respectively, from 6 to 67 and from 7 to 12. Much of the new legislation consisted of modifications of the original ordinances, but on the other hand a number of entirely new ordinances were published. The most important of the new ordinances were -

Ordinance No. 15. - Organization of working of telegraphs, telephones and wireless telegraphy.

Ordinance No. 17 - Powers of the Interallied Rhineland Navigation Commission.

Ordinance No. 18 - Interpreting Article 9 of the Rhineland Agreement and providing for the exemption from customs duties of the members and personnel of the High Commission and of the armies of occupation.

Ordinances Nos. 20 and 32 - Permitting the Administration of State Property (Reichsvermogensverwaltung) to operate in the Occupied Territories and defining the competence of that organization.

Ordinance No. 29 - Right of the High Commission to veto appointments of German officials in the Occupied Territories.

Ordinance No. 49 - Billeting and quartering of personnel of the High Commission and the armies of occupation.

Ordinance No. 53 - Settlement of industrial disputes.

Ordinance No. 59 - Interpreting Article 6 of the Rhineland Agreement regarding the right of requisition.

Ordinance No. 65 - Associations and educational establishments.

Ordinance No. 67 - Sport and the transport of arms, ammunition and war material.

Article 5 of the Rhineland Agreement gave the High Commission authority to adapt the civil administration of the occupied territories to the needs and circumstances of military occupation. The High Commission accordingly modified five German laws and suspended five others, in so far as their application to the occupied territories was concerned. In addition, Ordinance No. 48 was enacted, providing that in case of conflict between German laws or regulations and legislation of the High Commission, the latter should govern.

Obstructive Tactics of German Authorities.

During the latter part of 1920 there developed among the German authorities a disposition to oppose the authorities of occupation, to contest their demands and delay compliance therewith, and to obstruct the execution of their measures. These obstructive tactics were believed to have been inspired by the Berlin Government; at any rate the obstructive attitude became especially evident immediately after certain speeches had been made in the Rhineland by members of the German Cabinet. The chief offender was the Reichsvermogensverwaltung (National Property Administration), a body constituted by the German Government to meet the requirements of the forces of occupation with regard to funds, housing and military establishments in general.¹ In April, 1920, upon the assurance that the purpose of this organization was to cooperate with the authorities of

¹Volume I, Chapter 10. The Reichsvermogensverwaltung controlled all national property in the occupied territories.

occupation and to facilitate the supply of the armies' needs, the High Commission had authorized it to begin operations.

Early in 1921, the National Property Administration demonstrated its obstructive policy by refusing to make repairs to certain military establishments and to construct others, orders for which had been given by the military authorities. Incidents of its refusal to meet the legitimate demands of the military authorities were reported from all four zones. As Article 8 of the Rhineland Agreement provided that the German Government should place all necessary facilities at the disposal of the occupying forces, the High Commission adopted Ordinance No. 69; this ordinance authorized requisitions to be made directly on Burgormeisters, or others, whenever the National Property Administration failed to supply the needs of the armies. The advisability of excluding the organization from the occupied territories was also taken under consideration.

The American policy required prompt obedience to proper orders, but also involved just and even kindly treatment of the Germans. In general the American policy had been appreciated, especially by the local German officials, who had displayed good will and a spirit of co-operation. Now, however, both the people and the officials in the American area began to use obstructive tactics, and it appeared as if they were endeavoring to ascertain the extent to which they could safely go in this regard.

The policy of obstruction culminated in a series of systematic refusals to obey orders received from the military authorities of occupation. This resulted in the suspension from office of seven officials and the preferring of charges against them.

The officials were directed to submit their defenses to these charges. An examination of the defenses showed that the charges against two of the officials could not be sustained and that the action of the other five had been the result of instructions from the President of the National Property Administration. The latter was then called upon to explain why he had acted as alleged by the five suspended officials. After a further investigation of the matter the High Commission dismissed the President and three high officials from office and expelled them from the occupied territories, the cause being their wilful refusal to comply with lawful requisition orders of the military authorities. As the other implicated officials had been acting under instructions they were not dismissed from office, but the advisability of their transfer to other administrative duties was conveyed to the German Commissioner.

After this drastic action of the High Commission, no further difficulty with the National Property Administration was experienced and the period of obstructive tactics in general came to an end.¹

The Sanctions.

On March 8, 1921, the High Commission was informed by the Supreme Council that as the German Government had not accepted the decisions of the Allied Governments with regard to reparations, certain sanctions would be applied.² Among these sanctions

¹See Appendix 4 to this Chapter.

²See Volume I, Chapter 1.

were the following:

The duties collected by the German Customs Service on the external frontiers of the occupied territories was to be paid to the Reparations Commission.

The duties would continue to be levied in accordance with the German tariff.

A line of customs posts on the Rhine and on the perimeters of the bridgeheads was to be temporarily established. The tariffs, as to both imports and exports, to be applied on this line were to be determined by the High Commission in conformity with the instructions of the Allied Governments.

The High Commission was instructed to study the application of these sanctions, making an immediate report thereof to the Allied Governments.

Ordinance No. 77 was then adopted for the purpose of preventing the removal to unoccupied Germany of any funds derived from customs duties collected in the occupied territories. It established special regulations for the operations of the (German) Department of Customs, Department of Exports and Imports and the Office for the Prevention of the Flight of Capital. This ordinance and others dealing with the sanctions were issued by the High Commission in compliance with the decisions of the Allied Conference at London in March 1921, and not under the Rhineland Agreement. The ordinances and important decisions adopted in connection with the sanctions will be found in Appendix 5 to this chapter.

The management of the new customs service was entrusted by the High Commission to the Customs Managing Board, organized for the purpose and consisting of three members - the Belgians, British and French each having one representative. This body, together with the Economic and Financial Committees of the High

Commission, was directed to prepare a plan of the new customs system for submission to the Allied Governments. Officials of the latter immediately inaugurated a supervision of the German customs services on the external frontiers of the occupied territories.

On April 11 information was received from the Council of Ambassadors that the proposals of the High Commission had been approved. Ordinances Nos. 81 and 82, regulating the customs organization of the occupied territories and including special regulations with regard to imports and exports, were then published, and later were followed by Ordinances Nos. 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, and 91, all dealing with the new customs regime.

As soon as the new customs line was established, the German Government protested that it was a violation of the Treaty of Versailles and that the industries of the occupied territories would be ruined. Special protest was made against the requirement of licenses for shipments of goods into and out of the Rhineland. This system of licenses was open to serious objections from the Germans on three main counts -

It caused great delay to shipments and therefore reduced the amounts of imports and exports.

Licenses for the importation of luxuries or other unnecessary articles from Allied countries could be issued freely.

In order to encourage trade with the Allied countries, and especially with France, licenses for imports from Germany and neutral countries could be issued at discretion.

The fears of the Germans proved to have been justified, and they charged that the issue of licenses was influenced by favoritism, bribery and other forms of corruption. When the German complaints were taken under consideration by the High Commission, the several High Commissioners admitted that

discriminations in favor of the trade of Allied countries were being made. No apologies were offered, and the practice was justified on the grounds that the customs regime was one of sanctions, and the more effective the new regime proved the greater would be the injury to Germany.¹

The economic sanctions were officially removed on September 30, but the system of licenses, in a modified form, was continued in force.

The American authorities did not participate in the application of either the economic or the military sanctions. Orders from Washington prohibited any participation, and the policy of the American Department was one of observation only. However, the American Representative held the view that the sanctions had been adopted with a view to forcing Germany to agree with the demands for reparations (the London Ultimatum) and to create a revenue to be applied to the payment of reparations; therefore the efforts of the High Commission to work harm to the trade of the occupied territories were not justified.

Occupation of Duesseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort.

Another sanction applied to Germany as the result of her failure to accept the London Ultimatum was the occupation of the cities of Duesseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort. These cities are the Rhine parts of the great Ruhr-Westphalia coal and industrial district. The occupation was completed on March 8, 1921, by a

¹See Appendix 6 to this Chapter for the licenses granted under the system used.

large force of allied troops. French troops composed the bulk of this force and the Belgians were next in strength. A small British contingent participated in the occupation, withdrawing to Cologne within a short time thereafter.

This step gave control of all coal shipped from the Ruhr District by means of the Rhine. The High Commission was not concerned with the movement of the troops, but in the execution of its duties to provide for the safety of the armies of occupation, it published Ordinance No. 76. This Ordinance authorized the military authorities, in their discretion, to impose a censorship over the telephone and telegraph system and also to censor the press with regard to the publication of news of the movement of troops.

Subsequently the French High Commissioner proposed that the High Commission institute negotiations with the military authorities relative to an extension of its jurisdiction to the newly occupied territory which became known as the Duesseldorf-Duisburg-Ruhrort Bridgehead. The proposal was withdrawn and the military government of the new bridgehead was continued in force throughout 1921, although some of the legislation of the High Commission was applied there in a modified form.

Resignation of Herr von Starck, German Commissioner.

In the autumn of 1920 the French military authorities several times requested the German authorities to hand over to their jurisdiction a number of Germans charged with offenses against the forces of occupation. These requests were made in pursuance of Article 4 of the Rhineland Agreement which provided

for the arrest and handing over to the military authorities, upon their demand addressed to the German authorities in either unoccupied or occupied territory, of any person charged with an offense against the persons or property of the forces of occupation. As none of these requests had been complied with, on February 9, 1921, the High Commission informed the German Commissioner of the matter and granted him a period of ten days within which to furnish an explanation of the delay. His reply was considered unacceptable. A marked increase in the number of attacks against French soldiers had developed, the offenders taking refuge in unoccupied Germany where they were assured of immunity. In view of these facts the High Commission formally requested the German Commissioner to inform his Government that in failing to comply with the demands of the Allied military authorities made under Article 4 of the Rhineland Agreement and, above all, in systematically subjecting such demands to delay for which there was no justification, it was in danger of forcing the High Commission to take measures to obtain satisfaction. In order to prevent the escape of accused persons into unoccupied Germany, a control over the movements of persons between occupied and unoccupied territory might be instituted; and the High Commission might be compelled to ask their governments to withdraw their consent to the appointment of the German Commissioner.

On April 13 the High Commission warned the German Commissioner that if the German authorities failed to hand over the accused persons by April 18, the High Commissioners would ask their respective governments to withdraw their consent to his

appointment or even entirely to suppress the office of German Commissioner. The period of 5 days passed, and none of the accused had been surrendered. It appeared to the High Commission that the German Commissioner had been extremely dilatory in his efforts to effect the delivery of the accused persons, that the replies to the notes of the High Commission consisted merely of arguments attempting to show that in particular cases the German Government was not obliged under the Rhineland agreement to honor the requests, and finally that the attitude of the German Commissioner rendered him a hindrance rather than a help. The High Commission then addressed a note to the British, Belgian and French Governments, recommending that in accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Versailles note of July 29, 1919, they recall their approval of the appointment of Herr Von Starck as German Commissioner.

During the discussions leading up to the dispatch of this note, the French High Commissioner urged the making of a recommendation that the office of German Commissioner be abolished. He argued that the work of the High Commission could be done more efficiently through direct relations with the governments of the states having territory comprised in the occupied portion of Germany. As the other High Commissioners objected, the French High Commissioner did not press the point.

Anticipating the action of the Allied Governments, Herr von Starck resigned, leaving Dr. von Brandt, the Deputy Commissioner, to act in his stead until a successor should be appointed.

Appointment of Prince von Hatzfeld-Wildenburg.

Without delay, the German Government proposed that Prince von Hatzfeld-Wildenburg should replace Herr von Starck. On July 27 the Council of Ambassadors informed the German Government that the Allied Governments were disposed to approve its proposal, provided the following conditions were complied with:

The new German Commissioner should endeavor loyally to cooperate with the High Commission and should refrain from inciting systematic obstructions to its measures. He should exert his influence with the German officials with a view to putting an end to the inirical attitude and lack of courtesy toward the authorities of occupation.

Certain secret associations, whose object was to excite the population, would have to be dissolved.

The German Government should undertake to surrender the offenders demanded by the High Commission - in spite of repeated requests these offenders had not yet been delivered to the occupying authorities.

The German Government should promise to abstain from taking secret steps to nullify the judicial measures adopted in execution of the Rhineland Agreement by the Allied authorities.

On August 16 the German Government replied that it would comply with these conditions and expressed the hope that consent to the appointment of Prince von Hatzfeld-Wildenburg would be given. The Council of Ambassadors forwarded this information to the High Commission and recommended that if the German Government was ready to comply with the conditions cited, the High Commission should raise no objection to the proposed appointment.

Prince von Hatzfeld-Wildenburg arrived in Coblenz in September 1921. Shortly before his arrival, the French High Commissioner brought to the attention of the High Commission the fact that the German Government had again refused to deliver

an offender against the ordinances. He proposed a recommendation to the Allied Governments that they should consider the withdrawal of their agreement to the appointment of the successor to Herr von Starck. The other High Commissioners pointed out that the German contention in the case in question - that it did not come within the purview of the Rhineland Agreement - was susceptible of argument on both sides. It was finally decided to make no objection to the assumption of office by the new appointee.

The whole incident - the resignation of the German Commissioner and the appointment of his successor - shows an interesting phase of the French policy in the Rhineland. The German Commissioner was inherently an obstacle to the furtherance of the separatist movement and to the commercial penetration of the French; his activities, doubtless, were largely directed toward the keeping alive of a National spirit amongst the population of the occupied territories and to opposing the spread of French influence. It was probably in realization of the foregoing that from the beginning the French High Commissioner sought to bring about the abolition of the office; that he did not succeed was largely due to the stand taken by General Allen and the British High Commissioner.

Removal of the Economic Sanctions.

On August 13, 1921, the Supreme Council decided to abolish the economic sanctions which had been instituted on March 7. The removal of the sanctions was to be contingent upon the acceptance of certain conditions by the German Government, one of which read as follows:

The constitution of an interallied organization which will collaborate with the competent German authorities for the examination and delivery of licenses for the importation and exportation of goods to and from firms in the Occupied Territory of Germany, as defined by the Treaty of Versailles, the sole object of this organization being to insure that the operation of the German system does not result in setting up discriminations contrary to the provisions of Articles 264-267 of the Treaty, as far as the Occupied Territory is concerned.

The customs experts of the High Commission immediately began to draft plans for such an organization. Conflicting views developed, and the German Government displayed a disinclination to agree to the proposals of the Allies; the customs experts could not reach an agreement, and it was finally decided to submit the matter to the Supreme Council for decision.

On September 28, the Supreme Council informed the High Commission that the economic sanctions would be removed on September 30, and requested that all necessary measures should be taken. The High Commission then adopted Ordinance No. 98, repealing its customs sanctions and establishing transitional measures. One of the primary purposes of this ordinance was to insure the validity of actions taken during the maintenance of the customs regime. The Interallied organization mentioned above had not been established; hence it was also provided that until that body was ready to function, the existing organization for the issue of import and export licenses should be maintained in so far as goods crossing the external frontiers of the occupied territories were concerned.

The new interallied organization had not come into being at the end of 1921, and the old organization continued to function. Otherwise, with the publication of Ordinance No. 98 on

September 30, the Allied control of customs in occupied Germany had come to an end.

Separatism and the Smeets Incident.

Although supported by the French the Separatist movement did not develop any real strength during 1920 and 1921. There were two main obstacles in the path of the movement: the refusal of the Americans to permit a change in the Government of the American area except by constitutional means, and the strong opposition of all but a very small minority of the inhabitants of the occupied territories. Since the failures of the revolutionary attempts in 1919, both the movement and its leading exponent, Dr. Dorten, had fallen into disrepute among the Germans.¹

The Separatist movement was kept alive, however, largely by the "Rheinische Republik", a newspaper published in Cologne. This paper was edited by Herr Smeets, a German of questionable reputation, who had once been put in jail in the Belgian zone, but had since entered into more or less friendly relations with the French authorities.

Smeets organized a meeting in the interest of the Separatist movement, to take place in Bonn (French Area) on December 4.² The meeting was attended by several hundred persons, and addresses were made by Smeets and others, including several Frenchmen and one Belgian. The next day Smeets was arrested by the German authorities.

¹A.M.G., Volume I, Chapter 15.

²The American authorities were invited to attend the meeting, but declined to be represented there in any form. It was understood that the British had pursued the same policy.

for having failed to appear in court to answer a charge, preferred some time before, of insulting a policeman. At his request, Smeets was taken before the Cologne representative of the High Commission, who examined the papers in the case. The representative stated that the papers appeared to be entirely regular and that he could not interfere; he then directed that pending a decision by the High Commission, Smeets should not be removed from Cologne.

On the same day, the High Commission met in extraordinary session. The French Deputy High Commissioner stated that the French High Commissioner, then in Paris, had instructed him over the telephone to request the High Commission to secure the immediate release of Smeets and to see that all proceedings against the latter were quashed. The French Deputy High Commission said further that French public opinion was greatly aroused over the arrest of Smeets, and he insisted that the High Commissioner comply with the French request. For the time being no action was taken by the High Commission.

The French High Commissioner hurried back to Coblenz and called another meeting of the High Commission. Upon opening the meeting, he, as President, reminded the others present that the American Representative had no vote in matters coming before the High Commission.¹ After much discussion the High Commission ordered that pending its definite decision, Smeets be released.

¹The American Representative invited attention to the fact that except by the permission of the American Commanding General, the High Commission would exercise no authority in the American area. Such reminders as these two were very rarely made.

This action was taken in order to preserve harmony and was based upon the argument that Smeets had been arrested because of political acts begun during the Armistice and continued, after the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace.² The main reason for this action, however, was the understanding that the French Government had insisted upon the release of Smeets and had intimated that it would bring pressure to bear in order to effect it.

Industrial Disputes.

The boards of conciliation appointed by the High Commission settled a number of industrial disputes during 1921. Among these were strikes on the street railways of Coblenz and Munchen-Gladbach (Belgian area) and a strike of engine room crews on the Rhine.

The strike of the street railway employees in Coblenz caused some difficulty, as they struck without having complied with Ordinance No. 53. The leaders were then arrested, and the other employees were informed that they would be prosecuted unless they resumed work at once. At the same time they were informed that they were at liberty to strike after having complied with Ordinance No. 53. The striking workmen immediately resumed work, and shortly afterward the board of conciliation effected a compromise.

In the strike of the engine room crews the High Commission was confronted with a more difficult problem. The crews had declined to accept the wage scale and working hours proposed by the shipping concerns and the German authorities.

²See Ordinance No. 70.

Portions of the right bank of the Rhine were in the neutral zone and many of the strikers resided in unoccupied territory; hence it was impracticable to proceed against them for failure to comply with Ordinance No. 53. Nevertheless, the High Commission informed the striking crews that the ordinance must be observed and that it would not tolerate a waterways strike or a wilful stoppage of traffic. The strikers were told that if they failed to heed this warning, they might be brought to trial. The strike was finally settled when both sides accepted conditions which had been formulated in large part by a board of conciliation.

There were two serious railroad strikes in Germany during 1921. The first strike, which occurred in January, did not spread to the occupied territories, as the High Commission had informed the railway personnel that a strike in the Rhineland would not be permitted, since the maintenance, safety and requirements of the forces of occupation would be endangered thereby. In December, during the second strike, a number of workmen disobeyed orders and stopped work. Their services were requisitioned by the military authorities, after which there was no further trouble on the railroads in the occupied territories.

Additional Legislation.

Among the important ordinances enacted during 1921 were the following:

Ordinance No. 69 - Contributions to be made by the German Government in pursuance of Article 8 of the Rhineland Agreement.

Ordinance No. 71 - Espionage, etc.

Ordinance No. 90 - Right of the High Commission to divert the German authorities and courts of certain cases which concerned the Allied forces.

In addition three German laws were suspended in so far as they applied to the occupied territories.

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